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Article 
Labor’s Soft Means and Hard Challenges: 
Fundamental Discrepancies and the 
Promise of Non-Binding Arbitration for 
International Framework Agreements 
César F. Rosado Marzán†
  INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM   
 
International framework agreements (IFAs) are agree-
ments in which multinational companies and global union fed-
erations (“global unions”) pledge to abide by the “core labor 
standards” of the International Labor Organization (ILO), to 
wit, freedom of association and the effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining, elimination of all forms of forced 
or compulsory labor, effective abolition of child labor, and elim-
ination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupa-
tion.1 Global union federations (“global unions”) are labor or-
ganizations composed of national labor organizations, normally 
categorized by industry groups.2
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Bruun, John F. Coyle, Marty H. Malin and Joan E. Steinman. The author also 
would like to thank Laura Caringella, Meron Kebede, and the editorial team of 
the Minnesota Law Review. Any errors and omissions remain the sole respon-
sibility of the author. Direct all inquiries to crosado@kentlaw.iit.edu. Copy-
right © 2014 by César F. Rosado Marzán. 
 IFAs today cover almost nine 
 1. Konstantinos Papadakis, Introduction to SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRI-
AL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS 1, 2 
& 17 n.1 (Konstantinos Papadakis ed., 2011).  
 2. To date there are eleven global unions representing workers from dif-
ferent global industries. See About Us, GLOBAL UNIONS, http://global-unions 
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million workers around the world, excluding contractors.3 The 
legal status and judicial enforceability of most of these agree-
ments is yet an open question.4 IFAs, or at least most of them, 
are considered to be “soft law” instruments.5
IFAs are global unions’ bilateral and negotiated response 
to unilateral corporate codes of conduct.
 
6 They may also provide 
global unions with a new institutional role to play in the global 
economy. At least one major study of union density has argued 
that without a global institutional framework for labor rela-
tions, labor union density—the rate of the wage and salaried 
workforce of a country that is member of a labor union7—will 
continue to decline in the developed, capitalist democracies.8
IFAs are still obscure instruments in the United States. 
Therefore, this Article reports on original, exploratory field re-
search by the author to better illuminate what these instru-
ments are about and what challenges possibly lay ahead for 
IFAs. The research uncovered that parties and other IFA 
stakeholders may disagree over the meaning of fundamental 
terms of their IFAs.
 
IFAs may be one way to globalize industrial relations and rein-
vigorate labor. 
9
 
.org/about-us.html?lang=en (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). The website defines 
global unions as: 
 Disagreements can become obstacles that 
stall the agreements and the construction of an international 
industrial relations system. 
Global Unions are international trade union organisations working 
together with a shared commitment to the ideals and principles of the 
trade union movement. They share a common determination to organ-
ize, to defend human rights and labour standards everywhere, and to 
promote the growth of trade unions for the benefit of all working men 
and women and their families. 
Id. 
 3. César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing with International Framework 
Agreements: An Exploratory Study, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2231564. 
 4. See infra Part I. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Renée-Claude Drouin, Promoting Fundamental Labor Rights Through 
International Framework Agreements: Practical Outcomes and Present Chal-
lenges, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 591, 591–95 (2010). 
 7. See BRUCE WESTERN, BETWEEN CLASS AND MARKET: POSTWAR UN-
IONIZATION IN THE CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES 24 (1997) (“A common and useful 
overall measure of union membership is union density—union membership as 
a percentage of the dependent labor force.”). 
 8. Id. at 195–96.  
 9. See infra Part III.  
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The Article provides one possible solution to resolve IFA 
interpretation issues between the signatory parties and other 
stakeholders: non-binding arbitration based on ILO norms. 
Some commentators of IFAs have explored ways to make IFAs 
judicially enforceable.10 However, here the author argues that it 
is unlikely that parties are ready to harden their agreements 
by making them judicially enforceable. Non-binding arbitration 
based on the ILO norms could help to incrementally harden 
IFAs and resolve interpretation disputes.11
The next part of this Article, Part I, details the ascension of 
IFAs, why the agreements can help rebuild labor, and why fur-
ther empirical research is needed to understand the IFAs’ po-
tential. Part II describes the exploratory research that the au-
thor undertook to contribute to our knowledge of these rather 
obscure and novel agreements. Part III describes the results of 
the study. It describes that fundamental disagreements regard-
ing the terms of the IFAs may surface after the IFAs are 
signed. Disagreements could be between the signatory parties 
and/or other stakeholders, such as national unions represented 
by global unions but that were not privy to the IFAs. Such dis-
agreements may endanger IFAs if they cannot be resolved. Part 
IV of the Article analyzes what the exploratory field research 
uncovered including the disagreements between signatory par-
ties and even signatory parties and other stakeholders. It sug-
gests that parties should include clauses for non-binding arbi-
tration based on ILO norms to resolve interpretation issues in 
future and renegotiated IFAs. Further research on how signa-
tory parties and other IFA stakeholders resolve their differ-
ences, including the few IFAs that already have arbitration 
clauses, can further help us to understand the future promise 
of IFAs.  
  
I.  THE ASCENSION OF IFAS AND WHY WE NEED TO 
KNOW MORE ABOUT THEM   
This is my copy of the global agreement. It’s like a bible, man. When 
management tells me to get out, I show them this. When workers are 
afraid to join, I show them this. When people tell me we don’t have 
the right, I point to this. This this this. This is the key. But only if we 
use it right.12
 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 
 11. See infra Part IV.  
 12. JAMIE K. MCCALLUM, GLOBAL UNIONS, LOCAL POWER: THE NEW SPIR-
IT OF TRANSNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZING 118 (2013) (quoting a South African 
unionist referring to his IFA with G4S, a multinational security company).  
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IFAs are agreements signed by global unions and multina-
tional firms.13 At a minimum, the parties who sign IFAs pledge 
to abide by the ILO’s “core labor standards.”14 Some IFAs may 
also include procedures for implementation and provisions con-
cerning suppliers and business partners.15 Many IFAs also in-
clude pledges regarding wages, working hours, workplace safe-
ty, training, and restructurings.16
It is uncertain whether any IFAs are legally binding in-
struments.
 
17
  
 Legal experts have argued that these agreements 
 
 13. Papadakis, supra note 1, at 2. 
 14. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 15. Drouin, supra note 6, at 593. 
 16. See SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTER-
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, app. at 249–56 tbl. 2. 
 17. See Alvin L. Goldman, Enforcement of International Framework 
Agreements Under U.S. Law, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 605, 632–34 (2012) 
(explaining that IFAs could be enforced under U.S. federal labor laws, contract 
law, consumer protection laws, and investor protection laws, but noting that 
the legal hurdles are very significant); see also INT’L TRAINING CTR. OF THE 
INT’L LABOUR ORG., KEY ISSUES FOR MANAGEMENT TO CONSIDER WITH RE-
GARD TO TRANSNATIONAL COMPANY AGREEMENTS (TCAS) 19 (2010), available 
at http://lempnet.itcilo.org/en/tcas/admin/final-pub (“The legal status of these 
agreements is unclear. They have never been tested in a court of law, so ques-
tions remain about their status and enforceability. It is a mistake, though, to 
assume that they have no legal status—it has still to be tested.”); Kevin Banks 
& Elizabeth Shilton, Corporate Commitments to Freedom of Association: Is 
There a Role for Enforcement Under Canadian Law?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 495, 511–29, 551–53 (2012) (explaining the numerous legal hurdles 
that must be overcome to enforce IFAs in Canadian courts under the law of 
contracts and labor laws); Sarah Coleman, Enforcing International Framework 
Agreements in U.S. Courts: A Contract Analysis, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
601, 603 (2010) (arguing that IFAs are enforceable under the common law of 
contracts and Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act); Rüdiger 
Krause, International Framework Agreements as Instrument for the Legal En-
forcement of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining? The German 
Case, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 749, 768 (2012) (“[I]t is not out of the ques-
tion that IFAs can be enforced legally in a German labor court. But there are 
many legal hurdles to surmount, and the prospects will depend highly on the 
concrete wording of the IFA and on the circumstances of its conclusion.”). 
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generally lack the elements of legally binding contracts, such as 
intent to be legally bound or certainty of terms.18 Therefore, 
IFAs are “soft law” instruments, meaning that the parties en-
force them themselves, through collaboration, rather than 
through judicial means.19 In industrial relations, such collabo-
ration normally occurs against the backdrop of potential indus-
trial conflict.20
IFAs are more than an academic curiosity. The growth of 
IFAs has been quite significant since the mid−1990s. The 
French foods company, Dannon, signed the first IFA in 1988.
 
21 
Multinational firms and global unions have signed about 110 
similar agreements since Dannon signed its IFA.22 Figure 1 
shows this growth over time. These agreements cover approxi-
mately nine million workers, excluding suppliers and subcon-
tractors.23
  
 
 
 18. But see Coleman, supra note 17, at 621–24, 630–33 (arguing that IFAs 
do not lack intent to be bound or certainty of terms). Moreover, while the con-
sensus is that these agreements are most likely not legally enforceable, some 
IFAs may be. The Securitas-UNI Global Union IFA, for example, states:  
Securitas and UNI recognise that this Agreement must be applied 
within the framework of laws and regulations that apply in each 
country and accept that no specific provision of the Agreement is le-
gally enforceable if it violates such laws. However, in the event a pro-
vision of this Agreement is invalid in any country, the remainder of 
the Agreement that is legally enforceable will remain in full force and 
effect. 
Global Agreement, Securitas AB-Swed. Transport Workers’ Union-UNI Global 
Union, ¶ 8, Oct. 26–Nov. 5, 2012 (on file with author). Therefore, the parties 
wanted to craft a legally binding instrument. Moreover, the agreement states: 
“[t]his Agreement shall be governed and construed with the laws of Sweden,” 
hence providing further evidence that the parties wanted courts to retain some 
level of supervisory authority over the instrument. Id. Whether the courts can 
issue injunctive relief compelling compliance with the instrument, or damage 
awards for breach of the IFA under Swedish law, or merely refrain from de-
claring the instrument unenforceable because it is illegal or contrary to public 
policy is an altogether different issue with no definite answer at this moment. 
 19. Goldman, supra note 17, at 606. 
 20. See Lance Compa & Fred Feinstein, Enforcing European Corporate 
Commitments to Freedom of Association by Legal and Industrial Action in the 
United States: Enforcement by Industrial Action, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
635, 635–37 (2012). 
 21. Papadakis, supra note 1, at 3. 
 22. International Framework Agreements, THE DATABASE ON EUROPEAN 
WORKS COUNCIL AGREEMENTS, http://www.ewcdb.eu/list_intl_framework_ 
agreements.php (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
 23. For inference of this estimation, see id.  
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Figure 1: IFAs Signed Each Year, 1994–2012  
Number of IFAs24
Multinational companies have signed IFAs because it helps 
them “manage risk.”
 
25 It also helps firms undertake restructur-
ings with collaboration from their employees.26 Unions and 
works councils27
 
 24. Adapted from European Trade Union Institute data. See International 
Framework Agreements, supra note 22. 
 in the home country of the signatory parties 
 25. Papadakis, supra note 1, at 9. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Works councils are, generally, employee representation bodies embed-
ded in the corporate governance regime of a firm. Joel Rogers & Wolfgang 
Streeck, The Study of Works Councils: Concepts and Problems, in WORKS 
COUNCILS: CONSULTATION, REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUS-
TRIAL RELATIONS 3, 6 (Joel Rogers & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995). They are 
independent of labor unions. Id. There are two main models of works councils, 
the German and French. In Germany, “works councils” generally refers to “in-
stitutionalized representation of interests for employees within an establish-
ment.” Works Council: Germany, EUROFOUND (last updated Aug. 14, 2009), 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/GERMANY/WORKSCOUNCIL-DE 
.htm. In France it more generally refers to an “[i]nstitution of employee repre-
sentation.” Works Council: France, EUROFOUND (last updated Aug. 14, 2009), 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/FRANCE/WORKSCOUNCIL-FR.htm 
(In the German model only employees are represented. BLANPAIN ET AL., THE 
GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 598 (2nd ed. 2012). The “French” model includes both 
employee and management representatives. Id. at 661. However, works coun-
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have been fundamental in persuading and compelling multina-
tional firms to sign IFAs.28 Professor Niklas Egels-Zandén has 
perhaps best explained why such national-level actors have 
mattered so much for IFAs. He argued that IFAs are part of a 
“continuous bargaining model” between employers and employ-
ee representatives who have had long and established relation-
ships.29 IFAs are one of many agreements made in the course of 
the parties’ relationship.30 Labor organizations outside the na-
tional boundaries of the signatory employers’ home country 
simply do not have that preexisting relationship of trust with 
the signatory employers.31
IFAs matter because they can help provide labor, which is 
still fettered by national boundaries, a more prominent role in 
the global economy.
 
32 As sociologist Jamie McCallum has de-
tailed, IFAs “mark the first instance in the history of the labor 
movement that transnational companies have bargained direct-
ly with unions at the global level.”33 They provide hope to a 
dwindling labor movement. As we can see in Figures 2 through 
5, union density in the world’s developed capitalist democracies 
has generally been declining for decades.34
 
cils are all creations of national legislation and will likely differ by country. 
Rogers & Streeck, supra at 
 While very few 
27. 
We must also note that even though works councils and unions are for-
mally independent, unions many times play important roles within works 
councils, particularly in Germany. Id. at 11–16. However, sometimes unions 
and works councils may be at odds. Id.  
 28. Michael Fichter & Markus Helfen, Going Local with Global Policies: 
Implementing International Framework Agreements in Brazil and the United 
States, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, at 85, 86, 91; Isabelle 
Schömann, The Impact of Transnational Company Agreements on Social Dia-
logue and Industrial Relations, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS, supra note 1, 21, 
26–27. 
 29. Niklas Egels-Zandén, TNC Motives for Signing International Frame-
work Agreements: A Continuous Bargaining Model of Stakeholder Pressure, 84 
J. BUS. ETHICS 529, 540–41 (2009). 
 30. See id. at 543 (referencing various types of agreements adopted by 
corporations including “IFAs, codes of conduct, and/or [corporate social respon-
sibility] policies/practices”). 
 31. See id. (describing the importance of a trusting corporate-union rela-
tionship compared to external pressures from non-governmental organizations 
in a corporation’s decision to enter an IFA). 
 32. MCCALLUM, supra note 12, at 37.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see OECD, http:// 
www.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union densi-
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countries, such as Belgium and some Scandinavian countries, 
have not seen significant drops in union density since the 
1970s, others such as the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, Aus-
tralia, and the United States have seen dramatic declines.35 In 
fact, private union density in the United States is now at about 
6.7% and keeps dropping.36
Figure 2. Union Density in Lower Density Countries, 
1960–2010 
 
Percentage of employees37
 
ty” to download data) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Cov-
erage Database from the Current Population Survey, UNIONSTATS.COM, http:// 
www.unionstats.com (follow hyperlink under “U.S. Historical Tables: Union 
Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment, 1973–2013: Private Sec-
tor”) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 37. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www 
.oecd.org (search “trade union density”; follow link to “Trade union density” to 
download data). 
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Figure 3. Union Density in Middle Density Countries, 
1960–2010 
Percentage of employees38
 
 
  
 
 38. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www 
.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union density” to 
download data).  
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Figure 4. Union Density in Middle/Higher Density Coun-
tries, 1960–2010 
Percentage of employees39
  
 
 
 39. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www 
.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union density” to 
download data). 
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Figure 5. Union Density in Higher Density Countries, 
1960–2010 
Percentage of employees40
 
 
  
 
 40. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
estimates. For further details on sources and methodology, see http://www 
.oecd.org (search “trade union density;” follow link to “Trade union density” to 
download data). 
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Sociologist Bruce Western concluded that a significant rea-
son for the decline of unions in the developed capitalist democ-
racies is the mismatch between the rise of global business and 
markets and the still national character of labor market regu-
latory institutions, i.e., labor law and labor unions.41 According 
to Western, unless the collective labor market actors regulate 
labor markets transnationally, union density in the developed, 
capitalist democracies will continue to decline.42 From a socio-
logical perspective, labor law seems to have lost its “empirical 
validity” in the developed, capitalist democracies, or its ability 
to shape the real world given the advent of globalization.43
Also tied to the need to give global labor an institutional 
role in the global economy is the attempt to use IFAs as alter-
natives to unilateral codes of conduct.
 
44 Today, most multina-
tional companies have adopted corporate codes of conduct 
where they make pledges regarding the firms’ social and envi-
ronmental responsibilities.45 However, these codes are difficult 
if not impossible to enforce or effectively use because they are 
unilaterally drawn by firms.46 IFAs, being at least bilateral in 
nature, are better situated to be implemented and enforced by 
their signatory parties and stakeholders.47
But are IFAs indeed helping to create a new framework for 
global industrial relations? Sociologist James McCallum re-
ports that Stephen Lerner, a prominent American labor union 
strategist, has argued that IFAs cannot be enforced and, as a 
result, should be abandoned as a tactical tool.
 
48
 
 41. WESTERN, supra note 
 Certainly, IFAs 
are hard, if not impossible to enforce legally. However, the no-
7, at 195–97.  
 42. Id.  
 43. See Michel Coutu, With Hugo Sinzheimer and Max Weber in Mind: 
The Current Crisis and the Future of Labor Law, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 
605, 613, (2013) (citing MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT [ECON-
OMY AND SOCIETY] 355 (1988)); id. at 622 (“[T]he empirical validity of labor 
law has been greatly diminished, in light of its basic incapacity in the context 
of globalization.”); see also Charles Tilly, Globalization Threatens Labor’s 
Rights, 47 INT’L LAB. & WORKING CLASS HIST. 1 passim (1995) (explaining 
that the decline of the national state in contrast to the increasing power and 
influence of global business has made labor law—which was national for most 
of the Twentieth Century—ineffective). 
 44. See Drouin, supra note 6, at 591–94. 
 45. See id. at 591 (describing the “rapid proliferation of private normative 
instruments concerning workers’ rights” in transnational corporations). 
 46. Id. at 592. 
 47. Id. 
 48. MCCALLUM, supra note 12, at 44. 
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tion that soft law instruments such as IFAs cannot be enforced 
at all is not necessarily true. As the words of the South African 
unionist cited above depict,49 IFAs can inspire local union activ-
ists to organize workers on the ground and bind employers 
morally and socially to the instrument. The literature on soft 
law has also shown that soft law can harden to bind actors be-
cause it helps to develop new norms that people begin to inter-
nalize.50 It can also serve as an alternative or complement to 
hard law.51 Under certain conditions, hard law and soft law can 
even become antagonists and displace one another.52 Soft law, 
therefore, could be used to re-regulate labor at a global level, be 
it as an alternative or an antagonist to hard law.53
Other critics could argue that IFAs are yet too marginal to 
be considered a significant breakthrough for global labor. Even 
if IFAs have been increasing at a pace of ten to fifteen a year, 
covering about nine million workers excluding contractors,
 Continued 
experimentation with and research of IFAs is therefore war-
ranted. 
54 
and total over 110,55
 
 49. See id. at 118.  
 these numbers are not extraordinary. As 
an ILO-related publication recently reported: 
 50. The literature is too vast to adequately cite and discuss here, but see 
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Com-
plements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 
712–21 (2010) (describing the canonical literature of soft and hard law). 
 51. See id.; see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Puzzling Evidence from a Trou-
bled Time: Rethinking State Promotion of Safe Work During the Bush Admin-
istration, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 295, 309 (2010) (explaining that the 
National Institute of Safety and Health (NIOSH), as a soft law agency, was 
able to effectively promote workplace safety during the Bush administration 
while the targeted Office of Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) could 
not). 
 52. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 50, at 788–99 (noting instances 
where the laws counter one another).  
 53. In a prior work, the author has argued that transnational movement 
mobilization, in the form of solidarity strikes, boycotts, and similar actions, is 
needed to help enforce IFAs. Rosado Marzán, supra note 3, at 25. Others have 
followed a similar line of research and argument. See, e.g., Compa & Feinstein, 
supra note 20, at 643–54 (investigating how industrial action can be used to 
enforce commitments); Dimitris Stevis & Michael Fichter, International 
Framework Agreements in the United States: Escaping, Projecting, or Globaliz-
ing Social Dialogues?, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 667, 686 (2012) (noting a 
sector’s effective invocation of IFA obligations as part of its campaign). 
 54. Rosado Marzán, supra note 3, at 25.  
 55. See International Framework Agreements, supra note 22; see also 
Framework Agreements, GLOBAL UNIONS, http://www.global-unions.org/ 
framework-agreements.html.  
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[W]e are still looking at a somewhat marginal phenomenon– the av-
erage lies between 10 and 15 agreements per year in a universe of 
about 80,000 multinationals worldwide. It is an activity that focuses 
very much on companies that have major importance to trade unions, 
in key sectors such as metalworking and telecommunications.56
When one considers that there are 80,000 multinational firms 
in the world and only around 110 have signed IFAs, the in-
struments seem trivial. Coupled with the fact that the instru-
ments are clustered in European firms, the IFAs seem like 
some sort of exotic European curiosity.
 
57
There is a long way to go before IFAs can become effective 
instruments for global labor. Nevertheless, some case studies 
show that some IFAs have helped national unions to effectively 
pressure employers to meet union demands.
 
58
Moreover, the coverage of IFAs is potentially much larger 
than that of the 110 firms that have currently signed the 
agreements. As of 2008, we know that about thirteen IFAs have 
mandatory terms covering suppliers.
 The little that we 
know about IFAs at least suggests that we need to learn more 
about their impact on the ground to better comprehend their 
effectiveness. 
59
Finally, we should not undervalue the role that iconic firms 
and industry leaders that have signed IFAs can have on the 
rest of the global economy.
 We do not know how 
many suppliers this amounts to and how many more workers 
are therefore covered by the terms of the IFAs, but the num-
bers could be quite substantial. Therefore, the 110 IFAs repre-
sent more than their nominal value. 
60 Industry leaders can help to ratch-
et up standards through best practices.61
 
 56. INT’L TRAINING CTR. OF THE INT’L LABOUR ORG., supra note 
 If movement actors 
such as global unions can help to publicize those best practices 
developed through IFAs, other firms may adopt IFAs or at least 
internalize many of the values inherent in these instruments.  
17, at 23. 
 57. Rosado Marzán, supra note 3, at 26 (detailing how most IFAs have 
been signed by companies based in Europe). 
 58. See Compa & Feinstein, supra note 20 (describing three cases of in-
dustrial action); Fichter & Helfen, supra note 28, at 103–10 (discussing six ex-
amples of positive IFA effects); Stevis & Fichter, supra note 53, at 689–90 
(noting how “concerted union action has delivered results” in certain instanc-
es). 
 59. SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 259–68. 
 60. ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS? 4–5 
(2001). 
 61. Id.  
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To summarize, IFAs have been growing in number since 
the 1990s. They are soft law instruments. They could be hard-
ened and enforced by the parties. More IFAs need to be signed 
before they can become effective global labor market regulatory 
instruments. However, the ones that we have may help to pro-
mote best practices that may catch on at a global level and help 
to diffuse IFAs. Whether or not they can be hardened, enforced 
and diffused are empirical questions that require further exper-
imentation and research to be answered. Therefore, this Article 
reports original empirical research on existing IFAs to enrich 
our knowledge of IFAs. The next section details the methodolo-
gy used to learn more about these instruments.  
II.  METHODOLOGY   
The author performed original field research for six months 
in Europe to study IFAs. He did the research from June 2012 
through November of 2012. The research was “exploratory,” 
meaning that it could not provide definitive answers to particu-
lar questions; rather, it helped the author better understand 
IFAs, a relatively obscure subject of scholarly inquiry.62
In this Article, the author reported on two industry groups, 
the global German auto industry and the global temporary ser-
vice agencies (“temp agencies”). The author chose these indus-
tries because they represent industries with different industrial 
relations trajectories, hence providing significant case variance 
to learn more about IFAs. Auto is a traditionally unionized in-
dustry where strong unions have dominated.
 
63 Temp agency 
workers, on the contrary, work casually and in time-limited 
contracts, if not precariously. They are seldom unionized.64
 
 62. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGNS AND METHODS 6 (3d 
ed. 2003) (describing exploratory study as one that attempts “to develop perti-
nent hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry”).  
 
 63. See BEVERLY SILVER, FORCES OF LABOR: WORKERS’ MOVEMENTS AND 
GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1870 41–43 (2003) (noting the “Fordist” organization of 
production in the auto industry has lent support to strong labor movements 
and that as the industry moves from region to region—from the United States, 
to Western Europe and Japan, to Brazil, to South Africa, and to South Ko-
rea—so do the autoworker unions and labor conflicts). 
 64. Unionization of temp agency workers is generally very low, but na-
tional variations exist. Temporary Agency Work and Collective Bargaining in 
the EU, EUROFOUND 17–19 (2009), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/ 
eiro/tn0807019s/tn0807019s.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). According to the 
author’s sources, U.S. employees of temp agencies lack union representation. 
Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, Senior Vice President, OCG-Centers 
of Excellence at Kelly Services (Oct. 8, 2012); Telephone Interview with Göran 
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Traditionally unionized industries such as auto have a greater 
likelihood of maintaining collective bargaining relations than 
non-traditionally unionized industries, such as the temp agency 
sector.65
The author studied the German auto firms Volkswagen 
and Daimler, the American staffing firms Manpower and Kelly 
Services, the Swiss staffing firm Adecco and the International 
Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (hereinafter re-
ferred to as “Ciett”, its acronym in French), the association rep-
resenting the staffing firms.
 Therefore, we should be able to learn different things 
from IFAs negotiated in traditional unionized industries and in 
those that are not. This said, and to reiterate, the cases were 
not chosen to test a specific hypothesis but, rather, to help the 
author learn about IFAs in an exploratory fashion. 
66 The author also interviewed rep-
resentatives of the German union IG Metall, which represents 
autoworkers; the global union IndustriALL, which also repre-
sents autoworkers; and UNI Global Union, which represents 
temp agency workers. The author also interviewed representa-
tives of the work councils of Volkswagen and Daimler involved 
in implementing the IFAs.67
 
Hultin, Government Affairs Advisor, Manpower, Inc. (July 19, 2012). Accord-
ing to UNI Global Union, which represents temp agency workers at a global 
level, a very small fraction of those workers may be unionized in the firms 
where the national members of the global union operate. Telephone Interview 
with Giedre Lelyte, Director, UNI Gaming & UNI Temp Agency Work, UNI 
Global Union (July 31, 2012). Indeed, temp agency work poses significant chal-
lenges to union organization. Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick, European Trade 
Unions and ‘Atypical’ Workers, 42 INDUS. REL. J. 293, 297–99 (2011). 
  
 65. See Joelle Sano & John B. Williamson, Factors Affecting Union De-
cline in 18 OECD Countries and Their Implications for Labor Movement Re-
form, 49 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 479, 479 (2008) (noting how “traditional union 
density” helps explain trends and cross-national variances in union member-
ship in the OECD region). 
 66. The type of interviewing the author used is referred to, in the social 
sciences, as “elite” interviewing. Elite interviewees are those who are particu-
larly knowledgeable about a subject and its context. BILL GILLHAM, RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWING: THE RANGE OF TECHNIQUES 54 (photo. reprint 2010) (2005). 
 67. The author did most of the interviews for the auto industry in Germa-
ny in person. The author digitally recorded all the interviews conducted in 
person. Because of time and cost concerns, the author did not transcribe any of 
the interviews but rather took notes during the interviews. On the day of the 
interview or a few days thereafter, the author used a word processor to put his 
notes into a more readable, accessible, and searchable format. The author also 
used the interview recordings to transfer his notes into a word processor. Fur-
thermore, because of practical and economic reasons, some informants of the 
auto industry had to answer interview questions by e-mail.  
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III.  RESULTS   
After analyzing the IFAs signed by Daimler, Volkswagen, 
and Ciett, and interviewing representatives of the signers, it 
was evident that the parties maintain differences over the 
meaning of their IFAs that can stall the IFAs and the develop-
ment of a global labor relations system. Some hardening of the 
IFAs seems necessary. 
A. THE AUTO IFAS OF DAIMLER AND VOLKSWAGEN68
The Daimler and Volkswagen IFAs have been used by 
global and national level unions to resolve a myriad of issues 
confronted by the firms, from restructurings to safeguarding 
freedom of association.
 
69
 
In-person interviews are costly, especially when they require internation-
al travel, but provide the researcher with more information as the interviewer 
can read body language and other non-verbal forms of communications. See id. 
 However, the particular rights that 
Telephone interviews are cheaper, since they do not require travel, but 
the interviewer may lose some information provided by non-verbal communi-
cative cues. Because of this, the telephone interviewer must remain more vigi-
lant and alert of what is being said in an interview than an in-person inter-
viewer. Similarly, telephone interviews are usually shorter in duration than 
face-to-face interviews because of the additional effort required to maintain 
meaningful communication. Id. at 103–06. 
E-mail interviews, like telephone interviews, are economical and provide 
instant access worldwide. Respondents can also answer the e-mail at their 
convenience. On the other hand, some elements of face-to-face communication 
are lost, as in the telephone interview. Responses can at times be too informal 
or abbreviated for research purposes, which forces the researcher to set a tone 
of formality for the e-mail exchange. Id. at 105–12. 
For similar reasons of time and economy, the author interviewed the temp 
agencies’ and UNI Global Union representatives by telephone. The author did 
not record any of the telephone interviews. Rather, the author took copious 
notes during the interviews and on the same day, or shortly thereafter, used a 
word processor to transfer his notes into a more readable, accessible, and 
searchable format. For more information regarding the persons interviewed 
for this study, see infra Appendix. 
 68. The author reported most of the information contained in this section 
regarding the German auto IFAs in a prior article. See Rosado Marzán, supra 
note 3. 
 69. Interview with Frank Patta, General Secretary of Group Works Coun-
cil, Volkswagen Group, in Wolfsburg, Ger. (Sept. 21, 2012) (freedom of associa-
tion); Interview with Claudia Rahman, International Department, IG Metall, 
in Frankfurt, Ger. (Sept. 3, 2012) (employer restructuring). See generally 
Dimitris Stevis, The Impacts of International Framework Agreements: Lessons 
from the Daimler Case, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra 
note 1, at 116–42; Isabel da Costa & Udo Rehfeldt, Transnational Restructur-
ing Agreements: General Overview and Specific Evidence from the European 
Automobile Sector, in SHAPING GLOBAL INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, supra note 1, 
at 143–63.  
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the IFA provides to national level unions remain vague. The 
vagueness may lead to interpretations inapposite to those 
sought by the national actors that seek to use the IFA in con-
crete situations. Conflicts can thus ensue between national ac-
tors, e.g., German and U.S. union officers. 
German subjects the author interviewed for this project 
told the author that U.S. union officers sought to have Daimler 
provide them with “card check” recognition under the IFA.70 
However, Daimler and the German unions and works councils 
rejected the American United Auto Workers’ (UAW) interpreta-
tion of freedom-of-association principles and what “neutrality” 
means under the IFA.71 The firm and German labor officials 
and employee representatives argue that the IFA promotes 
employer neutrality but not card check recognition for workers 
in the United States72 This means that unions will need to win 
union elections if they want to represent employees of German 
auto transplant in the United States that have signed IFAs. 
This difference between U.S. and German unions and employee 
representatives marks a rift in global labor.73
1. The Parties 
 
Daimler is one of the world’s leading producers of cars, 
vans, trucks, and buses.74
 
 70. The parties interviewed could not say whether Volkswagen was asked 
to provide card check recognition. However, the interviews suggest that 
Volkswagen has not provided such recognition, since German industrial rela-
tions experts all agreed that the agreement did not provide for card check 
recognition. Interview with Helmut Lense, Director of Automotive and Rub-
ber, IndustriALL Global Union, in Geneva, Switz. (July 11, 2012); Interview 
with Frank Patta, supra note 
 The company traces its history to 
1886 when Gottlieb Daimler and Carl Benz invented the auto-
69; Interview with Claudia Rahman, supra note 
69; Interview with Robert Steiert, Retired IMF and IG Metall Union Officer, in 
Zurich, Switz. (July 10, 2012).  
 71. Interview with Robert Steiert, supra note 70.  
 72. Id. 
 73. The author must reiterate that because the UAW failed to respond to 
numerous invitations for participation in this study, the author is not certain 
of the union’s view as to the German firms’ refusal to grant card check recog-
nition through the IFA. However, previous press reports confirm that recogni-
tion of card checks was a “top goal[]” of the UAW in contracting in the past. 
See Danny Hakim, Union Organizing Remains Muddled in Chrysler Pact, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/07/business/07AUTO 
.html.  
 74. Company, DAIMLER, http://www.daimler.com/company (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2014).  
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mobile.75 Headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, it has manu-
facturing operations in seventeen countries, including the 
United States, where it has numerous manufacturing facilities, 
most of which make trucks and vans.76 In 2012, Daimler pro-
duced 2.2 million vehicles.77 Its automobile plant in the United 
States is located in Tuscaloosa, Alabama.78 In 2012 that plant 
employed almost 3000 employees and produced over 180,000 
vehicles.79 It is also one of the very few Daimler plants in the 
world where the employees lack union representation.80
Volkswagen is the largest automaker in Europe.
 
81 In 2012, 
Volkswagen delivered to its global customers more than 9.2 
million vehicles, which is about twelve percent of the global 
passenger car market.82 Its headquarters are located in Wolfs-
burg, Germany.83 The company has almost one hundred manu-
facturing locations in twenty-seven countries, including one in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, where the company builds the Passat 
model.84 The Chattanooga plant has been in operation since 
2011.85 As is the case at the Daimler plant in Tuscaloosa, 
Volkswagen workers at Chattanooga are not represented by a 
union.86
 
 75. Id.  
 
 76. Locations in North and Central America, DAIMLER, http://www 
.daimler.com/company/daimler-worldwide (click map over North and Central 
America) (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 77. Company, supra note 74.  
 78. Locations in North and Central America, supra note 76 (follow “Tusca-
loosa, Mercedes-Benz Plant” hyperlink).  
 79. Id. (follow “facts and figures” hyperlink).  
 80. Stevis, supra note 69, at 133. 
 81. The Group, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/content/ 
vwcorp/content/en/the_group.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Production Plants, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/ 
content/vwcorp/content/en/the_group/production_plants.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). 
 85. Id. 
 86. On September 6, 2013, the New York Times reported that the UAW 
and Volkswagen were discussing ways to establish a union and a German-
style works council at the firm. Steven Greenhouse, VW and Its Workers Ex-
plore a Union at a Tennessee Plant, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/09/07/business/vw-and-auto-workers-explore-union-at 
-tennessee-plant.html; see also Erik Schelzig & Tom Krisheruaw, Majority at 
VW Plant Have Signed Union Cards, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, http:// 
www.suntimes.com/business/22505211-420/uaw-majority-at-vw-plant-have 
-signed-union-cards.html. The author attempted to get details on the subject, 
but the management of Volkswagen could speak no further on the matter. E-
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Like most large German firms, the corporate structure of 
Daimler and Volkswagen include a supervisory board and a 
managerial board.87 Employee representative comprise half of 
the supervisory board while stockowner representatives com-
pose the other half.88 Under German law, the supervisory board 
appoints and supervises the managerial board of the firm.89 
Employee representation in the firm’s management accounts 
for German “co-determination.”90
IndustriALL Global Union is a global union based in Gene-
va, Switzerland. IndustriALL claims that it represents fifty 
million workers in 140 countries.
 
91 Its constituent unions repre-
sent workers in the mining, energy and manufacturing sec-
tors.92 The global union was founded in 2012 when three for-
merly separate global unions, the International Metalworkers 
Federation (IMF), the International Federation of Chemical, 
Energy, Mine, and General Workers’ Unions, and International 
Textiles Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation, merged.93
Daimler entered into the IFA with the so-called “Daimler 
World Employee Committee,” referred to here as the “Daimler 
World Works Council,” in September 2002.
  
94
 
mail from Wolfgang Fueter, Director of Human Resources, Volkswagen Finan-
cial Services AG, to Author (Sept. 10, 2013 4:30AM) (on file with author). The 
UAW did not answer the author’s requests to speak about the matter. On Feb-
ruary 14, 2014, the UAW lost the union election in Volkswagen, with 712 votes 
against the union and 626 in favor of the union, despite management’s neu-
trality during the union elections. Steven Greenhouse, Volkswagen Vote Is De-
feat for Labor in South, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/02/15/business/volkswagen-workers-reject-forming-a-union.html?hpw& 
rref=business&_r=0. As this article goes to press, the UAW has requested that 
the NLRB set aside the election results because government officials and pri-
vate outside groups interfered with employees’ rights to organize. Dave Fless-
ner, UAW appeals to keep ‘outside groups’ out of decision on new union vote at 
VW plant, TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 12, 2104, http://timesfreepress.com/news/ 
2014/mar/12/uaw-appeals-nlrb-board-keep-outside-groups-out-dec/. 
 According to the 
 87. Senior Management, VOLKSWAGEN, http://www.volkswagenag.com/ 
content/vwcorp/content/en/the_group/senior_management.html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2014). For the law on employee participation in the supervisory 
boards of German firms see MANFRED WEISS & MARLENE SCHMIDT, LABOUR 
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMANY § 630, at 249 (4th ed. 2008). 
 88. WEISS & SCHMIDT, supra note 87, § 630, at 249. 
 89. Id. § 647, at 254. 
 90. BLANPAIN, supra note 27, at 603. 
 91. About Us, INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION, http://www.Industriall-union 
.org/about-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.  
 94. See Social Responsibility Principles of DaimlerChrysler, Daim-
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instrument, the Daimler World Works Council signed the IFA 
“on behalf of the International Metalworkers Federation 
(IMF).”95 Volkswagen signed its IFA in 2002. Like the Daimler 
IFA, the Volkswagen IFA was also entered between the IMF, 
today IndustriALL, and the Group Global Works Council of 
Volkswagen (hereinafter referred to as the “Volkswagen Global 
Works Council”). As in the Daimler IFA, the Global Works 
Council played the pivotal role.96
The role of the Global Works Councils in the German auto 
IFAs was fundamental. These employer representation bodies 
seem to have brokered the agreements between global man-
agement and the global unions. Given that the employee repre-
sentation bodies, the works councils, are governance structures 
of the firms—are part of the firm—German auto IFAs show 
that the management of these firms may be willing only to en-
ter into a global agreement with a party that it highly trusts, 
e.g., its own employee representation body. The global unions 
remained mostly nominal parties to the agreements. In this 
manner, German auto IFAs fit the “continuous bargaining 
model” explained by Professor Egels-Zandén and prior research 
that has noted the importance of pre-existing relations of trust 
for IFAs. 
  
2. What the IFAs Regulate 
The Daimler IFA is officially called the “Social Responsibil-
ity Principles of Daimler[].”97
 
lerChrysler AG, 4 (Sept. 2002), http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/ 
files/uploads/documents/GFAs/Daimler/daimler-gfa-english.pdf [hereinafter 
Daimler IFA]. Please also note that an identical version of the agreement es-
sentially corroborating the IFAs original language, but now only on behalf of 
Daimler, was more recently signed in February 2012 with the World Employee 
Committee on behalf of IMF. See generally Standards, Principles, and Guide-
lines, DAIMLER, http://reports2.equitystory.com/cgi-bin/show.ssp? 
companyName=daimler&language=English&report_id=nb-2008&id=603510& 
quickSearch=LA9 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). This Article only analyzes the 
September 2002 agreement because the 2012 agreement is too recent to eval-
uate its impact. Nevertheless, the article refers to the DaimlerChrysler 2002 
agreement as the “Daimler IFA” because Daimler and Chrysler are no longer a 
merged company. 
 The parties pledge to condemn 
 95. Id. The author could not verify the exact reasons why the Daimler 
Global Works Council signed the IFA “on behalf of the IMF” and why the IMF 
did not sign the instrument directly as a party. The legal meaning of such a 
signature is also hard to resolve.   
 96. See Stevis, supra note 69, at 122–23 (“A second important element of 
German industrial relations is that of works councils . . . .”). 
 97. See Daimler IFA, supra note 94.  
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child and slave labor and promote equal opportunity and equal 
pay for equal work.98 They also agreed that they would support 
employees’ rights to form unions, establish constructive rela-
tionships with the employees, and “involve and inform” em-
ployees as much as possible.99 The parties condemned all ex-
ploitative employment relations.100 They pledged to protect the 
health and safety of the company’s employees.101 They also 
pledged to provide “reasonable compensation of a level no less 
than the legally established minimum-wage and the local job 
market,” and abide by national laws regarding working time 
and provide training to its employees to facilitate “good perfor-
mance and high quality work.”102 The parties called on and en-
couraged Daimler’s suppliers to establish similar principles if 
they are to maintain a relationship with the firm.103 Finally, the 
parties pledged to establish a system of implementation in 
which management, labor, and auditors would work together to 
implement the instrument in the workplace.104
The Volkswagen IFA is somewhat shorter than Daimler’s 
and is written in more general terms. It calls itself the “Decla-
ration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at 
Volkswagen.”
  
105 Generally, the IFA mentions “the Conventions 
of the International Labour Organisation” as “rights and prin-
ciples” taken “into consideration” by the instrument.106 As all 
IFAs, the IFA also pledges to abide by the ILO’s core conven-
tions.107
 
 98. Id. at 1. 
 In addition to pledging to respect the ILO’s core labor 
 99. Id. at 2. 
 100. Id. at 3. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. Declaration on Social Rights and Industrial Relationships at 
Volkswagen, Volkswagen AG (June 6, 2002), http://www.Industriall-union.org/ 
sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/Volkswagen/vweng.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Volkswagen IFA]. 
 106. See id. pmbl.  
 107. The ILOs’ core conventions, which map onto Volkswagen’s “Basic 
Goals” in the IFA are, without exception: 29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930; 
87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 
1949; 98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949; 100 
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951; 105 Abolition of Forced Labour Con-
vention, 1957; 111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
1958; 138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973; 182 Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention, 1999. See Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://www.ilo 
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standards, the IFA also states that the firm will provide com-
pensation, working hours and health and safety standards that 
at least meet national legal criteria.108 Finally, the agreement 
has a “realisation” clause that calls for the signers to imple-
ment and enforce the agreement.109 It also encourages suppliers 
to follow similar principles.110
3. No Card Checks for American Workers 
  
Even though the parties signed agreements respecting the 
right of freedom of association, there does not seem to be con-
sensus on what that clause means for U.S. workers. According 
to a former German officer of the IMF and IG Metall, one of the 
author’s sources, while UAW believes, or at least at some point 
assumed, that the parties agreed on “card check recognition” in 
the United States, the German firms, works councils, and un-
ions disagreed.111 For the German parties, freedom of associa-
tion only entails that the employer does not proactively oppose 
the union in the workplace. The employer need not facilitate 
unionization through voluntary recognition or other means.112 
German and American unionists are therefore at odds over the 
importance of the so-called “card check” and its importance for 
freedom of association.113
Daimler’s IFA has explicit language regarding freedom of 
association and effective collective bargaining. The freedom of 
association language in the instrument ostensibly is strongly 
favorable to collective representation rights. It states: 
 
Daimler[] acknowledges the human right to form trade unions.  
During organization campaigns the company and the executives will 
remain neutral; the trade unions and the company will comply with 
basic democratic principles, and thus, they will ensure [that] the em-
ployees can make a free decision. Daimler[] respects the right to col-
lective bargaining. 
 
.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/ 
conventions-and-recommendations (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 108. See Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105, §§ 1.5–1.7. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Interview with Robert Steiert, supra note 70. The author attempted to 
get a response from the UAW about this matter but the union did not answer 
any of the author’s requests. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Note, however, that the UAW did not respond to the author’s request 
to participate in this study. The evidence presented here regarding the card 
check comes from interviews with German industrial relations representatives 
and secondary literature. 
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Elaboration of this human right is subject to national statutory regu-
lations and existing agreements. Freedom of association will be grant-
ed even in those countries in which freedom of association is not pro-
tected by law.114
Management pledged to follow the ILO’s core labor stand-
ards.
 
115 The company would even go beyond national laws, if 
necessary, to live up to freedom-of-association principles.116
The Volkswagen IFA’s “Freedom of Association” clause is 
somewhat similar to that of Daimler, but not exactly the same. 
It states, perhaps more generally than the Daimler IFA, that:  
  
The basic right of all employees to establish and join unions and em-
ployee representations is acknowledged. Volkswagen, the unions and 
employee representatives respectively work together openly and in 
the spirit of constructive and co-operative conflict management.117
The clause supports a basic right to organize and of employees 
to be represented, and to maintain cooperative relations.
 
118
The policy of both German auto manufacturers regarding 
union recognition seems to be that they will remain “neutral” 
during the organizing drive. German automakers still want a 
formal vote by the workers to demonstrate their support of the 
union. These two German automakers do not seem to favor 
voluntary recognition and card checks for U.S. workers even 
though U.S. unions today favor card checks over traditional 
NLRB elections.
 
119 U.S. unions and many pro-union lawyers 
and scholars prefer the card check because traditional union 
elections let employers run an anti-union campaign, which un-
ions allege will coerce and intimidate employees to vote against 
the union.120
 
 114. Daimler IFA, supra note 
 Even though, under U.S. federal labor laws, em-
94, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 115. See id. at 1 (describing their implemented policies as the policies “that 
are oriented at the conventions of the International Labour Organization”). 
 116. This is evidenced by Daimler’s promise that “[f]reedom of association 
will be granted even in those countries in which freedom of association is not 
protected by law.” Id. at 2. 
 117. Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105, § 1.1.  
 118. See id. 
 119. See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recog-
nition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 822 (2005) 
(noting that “[n]eutrality agreements combined with card checks” has now 
“become the principal strategy pursued by many labor organizations”). 
 120. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation 
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 516–23 (1993) (noting 
employers and workers are locked in unequal bargaining relationships and the 
union election model of the NLRA has fostered a wrong impression that un-
ions and employers square off as equals in election campaigns, just as political 
parties in government elections); Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law 
Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil 
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ployers must campaign in a way that expresses a mere “opin-
ion” that does not amount to an illegal “threat of reprisal or 
force or promise of benefit,”121 employers can express their opin-
ions in many settings, such as “captive audience meetings” that 
employees have no choice but to attend and hear the employer’s 
message.122 Employers need not provide “equal time” to the un-
ion or give it access to company property.123 Employees normal-
ly must attend the captive audience meetings at the risk of be-
ing fired. They may have no right to speak at the meeting and 
express their own views there.124
Critics of the NLRB election process also have pointed out 
that the law provides weak remedies against law-breaking em-
ployers.
 
125
 
Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 369, 372 (2001) 
(“[N]eutrality agreements can redress four disadvantages unions confront 
when organizing: employer intimidation, harmful delay, inadequate access to 
employees, and inability to secure a first contract.”). 
 In theory, workers can obtain reinstatement and 
back pay, minus mitigation (wages earned at other jobs during 
 121. National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158c (2012); see also 
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (“Thus, an employer is 
free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism 
or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the communi-
cations do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.’ He 
may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization 
will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be 
carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief 
as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a 
management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unioniza-
tion.”). 
 122. See Elizabeth J. Masson, Note, “Captive Audience” Meetings in Union 
Organizing Campaigns: Free Speech or Unfair Advantage?, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 
169, 171 (2004) (describing worker attendance as “mandatory” and explaining 
that “workers can be fired for refusing to attend”). 
 123. The Supreme Court stated:  
[T]he Taft-Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as 
a matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the 
use of every possible means of reaching the minds of individual work-
ers, nor that they are entitled to use a medium of communication 
simply because the employer is using it. 
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958). 
 124. See Masson, supra note 122, at 171–72 (2004) (“Workers can . . . be 
prohibited from asking questions or speaking during the meeting, upon pain 
and discipline, including discharge.”). 
 125. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1773–74 (1983) (“The 
existing representation system under the NLRA provides employers with the 
opportunity to coerce employees in their choice about unionization, and the 
remedies administered by the National Labor Relations Board . . . cannot—
stem the resulting tide of abuses.”). 
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the period the employee did not work for the employer, as a re-
sult of an unfair dismissal).126 According to some scholars, such 
remedies are ineffective because employers sometimes delay re-
instatement of workers for as long as three years through ap-
peals and other tactics.127 Even when employees are reinstated, 
they usually leave the job within two years as a result of vin-
dictive treatment by the employer.128 Some labor law scholars 
agree that, given the high costs of a union contract and the low 
costs of breaking the labor law, many employers simply inter-
nalize breaking the labor law as a cost of doing business.129
Because many unions view current labor law as an ineffec-
tive instrument to protect workers’ rights to join unions and 
bargain collectively, they have sought alternative routes to un-
ion certification. The main alternative route has been voluntary 
recognition and card checks, or labor-management agreements 
in which the employer pledges to recognize the union if the un-
ion can show it has support from a majority of the workers 
without necessarily going through a formal union vote.
 
American labor law is thus too permissive of employer miscon-
duct and fails to provide adequate means to police the slim pro-
tections that it does afford to workers. 
130 Under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), unions can represent 
workers for collective bargaining only if the union has obtained 
“majority support”—fifty percent plus one—from the workers it 
seeks to represent. Once the union obtains majority support, it 
retains the right to represent the workers as their “exclusive 
representative.”131
 
 126. See id. at 1787–93 (discussing the remedies available to employees 
under the NLRA and assessing their functionality). 
 Such support can be expressed through card 
 127. See Weiler, supra note 125, at 1795 (explaining that enforcement or-
ders in unfair labor practice proceedings can be forestalled “nearly 1000 
days”). 
 128. See id. at 1792 (noting that eighty percent of employees who accepted 
reinstatement “were gone within a year or two” blaming their departure on 
“vindictive treatment”). 
 129. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1537 (2002) (arguing that the remedies of rein-
statement and back pay after mitigation “may be seen as a minor cost of doing 
business by an employer committed to avoiding unionization”). 
 130. See Brudney, supra note 119, at 822 (referring to neutrality agree-
ments and card checks as “the principal strategy pursued by many labor or-
ganizations”). 
 131. Under U.S. Federal labor law, recognized unions are “exclusive repre-
sentatives”—meaning that they have a monopoly over representation rights. 
As the NLRA states: 
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checks132—when more than half of the workers sign union au-
thorization cards—or through a union election, administered by 
the NLRB.133 However, employers need not recognize the union 
through “card checks.” Card check recognition is legal but vol-
untary.134
German automakers—and the German unions and em-
ployee representatives interviewed—did not agree with Ameri-
can unions on the desirability of “card checks.” A retired officer 
of IMF and the German metalworkers union that bargained the 
Volkswagen IFA, IG Metall, told the author that, in his opin-
ion, the IFA does not include voluntary recognition and card 
checks even though it contains a pledge in favor of freedom of 
association.
  
135 The former German union officer’s comments 
were not just stray remarks. A current officer of IndustriALL 
told the author that IFAs “secure the job of workers.”136 The 
employers pledge not to retaliate against union activists for en-
gaging in union activity.137
 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective 
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employ-
ees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to 
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em-
ployment. 
 Such pledges matter because in 
National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159a (2012) (emphasis added). 
Professor Charles Morris has argued, however, that the idea that only ex-
clusive representatives certified by the NLRB have the legal right to compel 
employers to bargain is merely “conventional wisdom” as minority unions, ab-
sent an exclusive representative, have the same rights to bargain with an em-
ployer to the extent they bargain only for the union members. See CHARLES J. 
MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 85–88 (2005) (explaining how the notion that only cer-
tified or recognized exclusive representative unions have a right to bargain 
with an employer is merely a conventional wisdom that is inapposite to the 
NLRA and its history); see also infra Part IV.A (discussing minority unions in 
the context of IFAs and the International Labour Organization). 
 132. Lamons Gasket Co., 357 N.L.R.B. 72, 2 (2011) (“Congress has express-
ly recognized the legality of employers” voluntary recognition of their employ-
ees’ freely chosen representative, as well as the place of such voluntary recog-
nition in the statutory system of workplace representation.”). 
 133. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). 
 134. See Brudney, supra note 119, at 824 (“The employer may lawfully ac-
cede to this request (provided there is in fact uncoerced majority support for 
the union).”). 
 135. Interview with Robert Steiert, supra note 70; see also Volkswagen 
IFA, supra note 105, § 1.1. 
 136. Interview with Helmut Lense, supra note 70. 
 137. See, e.g., Daimler IFA, supra note 94, at 2 (promising non-interference 
of management in labor organization efforts and recognizing the right to free 
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some countries, such as the United States, employers often fire 
union activists.138 According to the IndustriALL officer, the IFA 
prohibits “obvious” and “clear” violations of freedom-of-
association principles, such as dismissing a worker because of 
his or her union activities.139 It does not, however, necessarily 
support voluntary recognition and card checks.140
A similar viewpoint was expressed by an officer of the pow-
erful German union IG Metall, which represents millions of 
metallurgical workers in Germany, including autoworkers.
 
141 
She told the author that the IFAs’ language clearly bans intim-
idation and union busting tactics.142 However, as she told me, 
the IFA’s freedom of association clause “does not . . . automati-
cally recognize the union” if workers bring the signed union 
cards to the firm.143
A member of the Volkswagen Global Works Council opined 
to the author that the IFA clearly established “positive neutral-
ity,” meaning that Volkswagen would not engage in anti-union 
tactics.
  
144 Therefore, the company should not try to engage in 
union avoidance techniques.145 Workers should feel at liberty to 
speak about the union without fearing retaliation.146 However, 
the IFA did not necessarily imply that management would fa-
cilitate unionization by providing voluntary recognition.147
 
association); Volkswagen IFA, supra note 
  
105, § 1.1 (acknowledging the basic 
right of all employees to organize). 
 138. For recent examples of such occurrences, see, e.g., Davie Jamieson, 
Walmart Striker Fired 6 Months After Solo Walkout in Florida, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 30, 2013, 7:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/30/ 
walmart-walkout-florida_n_3354689.html and Michael Levenson, At Rally, 
Walsh Urged to Support Fired School Bus Drivers, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2014, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/02/02/union-rally-mayor-walsh-urged 
-support-fired-school-bus-drivers/QijNlz8rTcg8sH338woreM/story.html. 
 139. Interview with Helmut Lense, supra note 70. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall), EUR. METALWORKERS’ 
FED’N, http://www.emf-fem.org/Affiliates/Germany/IG-Metall (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). 
 142. Interview with Claudia Rahman, supra note 69. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Interview with Frank Patta, supra note 69. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. The works council member acknowledged that he personally believed 
that the union should be organized in simplest possible pathway—e.g., volun-
tary recognition through card checks. See id. However, he thought that the 
agreement did not necessarily provide for voluntary recognition and card 
checks. See id. 
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In sum, German unionists and the Volkswagen Global 
Works Council member do not think the IFA includes language 
that necessarily provides voluntary recognition and card checks 
for American workers. Rather, they think the IFAs provide 
language that stops the employers from proactively (“positive-
ly”) engaging in union opposition, as is frequently done by em-
ployers in the United States  
My exploratory research suggests that, at a global level, 
the union movement does not share consensus as to what free-
dom of association should entail for U.S. workers, e.g., card 
checks or union elections where employers remain “neutral.” 
With such lack of consensus, U.S. unions have a difficult task 
to legitimately call for card checks based on basic freedom of 
association rights developed by international norms. Mean-
while, some skeptics may argue that German workers could 
gain from weak unions and lower wages in the United States 
and elsewhere, as lower wages abroad enable German firms to 
get richer and be more able to increase wages and other bene-
fits for their German workers.148 As German firms become more 
transnational, to the point where the sales revenues of German 
subsidiaries outside of Germany outpace the total value of 
Germany’s exports, the German political economy and its labor-
friendly corporate models may depend on disparate labor costs 
and conditions at home and abroad.149
 
Evidence of the German automakers’ position can be traced back to 1999, 
when the Wall Street Journal reported that the UAW’s President at the time, 
Stephen Yokich, was surprised by Daimler’s refusal to voluntarily recognize 
the union in Tuscaloosa through card checks even though the company had 
stated that it would not oppose the union. Jeffrey Ball, UAW’s Reception in Al-
abama Mercedes Plant Is Sour, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A15. The UAW’s 
President sat on the very influential Supervisory Board of the firm, half of 
whom were employee representatives. Id.; see also Supervisory Board of Daim-
ler AG, DAIMLER AG, http://www.daimler.com/supervisoryboard (referencing 
the German legal requirement that half of Board members be representatives 
of employees). Yokich raised complaints there, but to no avail. See, e.g., Lind-
say Chappell, Mercedes Union Bid Attacked on Two Fronts, AUTO. NEWS (Aug. 
17, 2006, 12:01 AM) http://www.autonews.com/article/20060417/SUB/ 
60413029 (referencing the eventual failure of Yokich’s efforts in 2000).  
 These disparities open 
 148. For example, research has shown a positive correlation between out-
sourcing and domestic plant productivity in the German manufacturing sector, 
buttressing some suspicions that currently employed German industrial work-
ers may benefit from outsourcing if increased productivity at home aided by 
outsourcing translates into higher pay at home. See Craig Aubuchon et al., 
The Extant and Impact of Outsourcing: Evidence from Germany, 94 FED. RES. 
BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 287 (2012). 
 149. See, e.g., Bertrand Benoit & Richard Milne, Germany’s Best-Kept Se-
cret: How Its Exporters Are Beating the World, FIN. TIMES, May 16, 2006, 
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possibilities for opportunism, or at least suspicions of it, and 
bode ill for the fledgling global labor movement. 
B. THE TEMP AGENCY IFA 
A global representative of temp agencies, Ciett, many of its 
global corporate members, and UNI Global Union signed the 
temp agency IFA.150 The temp agency IFA establishes pledges 
to live by the ILO core labor rights, ILO Convention 181151 and 
ILO Recommendation 188152 on temp agency work, which at-
tempt to provide a regulatory environment for legitimate and 
socially beneficial temp agency work.153 Importantly, it got a 
pledge from Ciett to not provide employees who may be used as 
strike breakers by user firms.154 However, after signing the 
IFA, UNI Global Union signed a document with all other global 
unions titled “Global Union Principles on Temporary Work 
Agencies” where temp agency work was strongly criticized by 
the global unions.155 Ciett disagreed with the criticism,156 lead-
ing its relation with UNI to sour and the IFA to lose potency.157
 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54730f00-e6d4-11da-a36e-0000779e2340.html# 
axzz2cYSxqgv0. 
 
 150. See Memorandum of Understanding Between Ciett Corporate Mem-
bers & UNI Global Union on Temporary Agency Work (Oct. 24, 2008), http:// 
www2.asetuc.org/media/04c%20%28ENG%29%20MOU%20CIETTE%20UNI 
.pdf [hereinafter Temp Agency IFA]. 
 151. Convention (No. 181) Concerning Private Employment Agencies, June 
19, 1997, 2115 U.N.T.S. 249 [hereinafter ILO Convention 181]. 
 152. Int’l Labour Org., Recommendation Concerning Private Employment 
Agencies (June 19, 1997), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0: 
:NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312526 (establishing detailed rules for 
temporary employment agencies, including but not limited to rules pertaining 
to non-discrimination, privacy, and bans against provision of strikebreakers). 
 153. See Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Statement, Council of Global Unions, Global Union Principles on 
Temporary Work Agencies (Jan. 23–24, 2012), http://www.global-unions 
.org/spip.php?action=acceder_document&arg=471&cle=9c244964753f3de9a973 
72156a49fb567f009f34&file=pdf%2Fgu_temp_work_agencies_principles.pdf.  
 156. See Ciett Reacts to Global Unions’ Principles on TAW: “TAW Is the 
Most Secure Form of External Flexible Employment”, CIETT, http://www 
.ciett.org/index.php?id=110&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=118&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1& 
cHash=0e274d2c9c (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 157. For a contemporaneous reaction from Ciett, see Meeting with Philip 
Jennings—UNI Global, CIETT & EUROCIETT PUB. AFF. 2 (Apr. 2012), http:// 
www.rcsa.com.au/documents/other_docos/Ciett%20Public%20Affairs% 
20Report%20-%20April%202012.pdf. 
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1. The Parties 
Ciett, its corporate members Adecco, Kelly Services, Man-
power, Randstad, USG People, and Olympia Flexgroup, and 
UNI Global Union signed the temp agency IFA on October 24, 
2008.158 UNI Global Union signed the IFA in representation of 
its member unions in the following sectors: agency staff, com-
merce, electricity, finance, gaming, hair and beauty, graphical, 
IT and business services, media and entertainment, postal, 
property services, social insurance, and telecom.159
 Ciett is a global organization based in Brussels, Belgium, 
representing temp agencies.
 
160 It was established in 1967.161 Its 
main goals are to support friendly regulatory environments for 
temp agency work and transmit a positive message about said 
work.162 As its website states, Ciett’s “main objectives are to 
help its members conduct their businesses in a legal and regu-
latory environment that is positive and supportive and to gain 
recognition for the positive contribution the industry brings to 
better functioning labour markets.”163
Ciett has two parallel lines of membership: “national 
members” and “corporate members.”
 In this manner, Ciett has 
a very clear regulatory goal in favor of temp agencies and a 
commitment to disseminate a message showcasing the positive 
contributions of temp agency work to labor markets. 
164 The website provides: 
“Ciett consists of 48 national federations of private employment 
agencies and 9 of the largest staffing companies worldwide: 
Adecco, Allegis Group, Gi Group, Kelly Group Limited, Kelly 
Services, Manpower, Randstad, Recruit Co., LTD. and USG 
People.”165 The IFA between UNI and Ciett was signed by most 
of its corporate members.166
 
 158. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 
  
150, ¶ 5. Olympia, a signatory of the 
IFA, was a German temp agency. However, it went out of business after it 
signed the IFA. See, e.g., Olympia Flexgroup Sells Business in a Few European 
Countries, UNI GLOBAL UNION (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.uniglobalunion 
.org/news/olympia-flexgroup-sells-business-a-few-european-countries.  
 159. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, at 1 n.1. 
 160. See CIETT, http://www.ciett.org (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 161. History & Main Achievements, CIETT, http://www.ciett.org/index.php? 
id=34 (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 162. See Mission & Objectives, CIETT, http://www.ciett.org/index.php?id=35 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 163. See CIETT, supra note 160. 
 164. Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, Managing Director, Ciett (Ju-
ly 20, 2012). 
 165. CIETT, supra note 160. 
 166. See Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 5. 
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Adecco considers itself the largest employment agency167 in 
the world, with over 31,000 in-house employees and around 
5100 branches in over 60 countries and territories.168 It states 
that on any given day it places 650,000 workers with user 
firms.169
Manpower is another staffing giant, making U.S. $22 bil-
lion in revenue from its staffing operations in 2011.
  
170 It is 
based in the United States.171 It transacts business in over 
eighty countries172 and has over 3500 offices.173
Randstad is a Dutch corporation.
 
174 Its company website 
states that it has over 29,000 in-house employees, working in 
4496 branches.175 Every day the company places about 581,000 
people in user firms.176
Kelly Services is an American firm.
  
177 It has approximately 
8100 in-house employees around the world and placed about 
540,000 people in user firms in 2013.178
USG People is a firm based in the Netherlands.
 
179
 
 167. According to an Adecco representative, the firm considers itself more 
than a temp agency. It considers itself a “private employment agency” that 
provides “the full scale of HR solutions.” E-mail from Bettina Schaller, Grp. 
Pub. Affairs, Adecco, to author (Sept. 17, 2013, 04:31 CST) (on file with au-
thor). The Article refers to Adecco as a “temp agency” for shorthand only. 
 Accord-
ing to its website, the company provides employment services 
 168. Who We Are and What We Do, ADECCO GRP., http://www.adecco.com/ 
about/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See ManpowerGroup 2012 Annual Report, MANPOWERGRP. 50 (2013), 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MAN/2949689866x0x648084/0293B1D4 
-61C0-4702-8467-9E60BF4D9344/MAN_Annual_Report_2012.pdf. 
 171. Id. at 96. 
 172. About ManpowerGroup, MANPOWERGRP., http://www.manpowergroup 
.com/wps/wcm/connect/manpowergroup-en/home/about/#.Uvg_g7Sh6tZ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 173. Brands, MANPOWERGRP., http://www.manpowergroup.com/wps/wcm/ 
connect/manpowergroup-en/home/about/brands/#.UvhEP7Sh6tY (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2014). 
 174. See Contact Us, RANDSTAND HOLDING N.V., http://www.randstad 
.com/contact-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 175. Company Information, RANDSTAD HOLDING N.V., http://www.randstad 
.com/about-us/company-information (last visited July 11, 2013). 
 176. See id. 
 177. Company Overview, KELLY SVCS. INC., http://www.kellyservices.com/ 
Global/About-Us/Company_Overview/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
 178. See id. 
 179. About Us, USG PEOPLE, http://www.usgpeople.com/about-us (last vis-
ited Mar. 25, 2014). 
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in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland.180
UNI Global Union is a service industry global union based 
in Nyon, Switzerland.
 
181 Its website says that it represents 
about twenty million service sector workers around the 
world.182 It has about 900 affiliated unions in 140 countries.183 
These unions represent workers in the cleaning and security 
sectors, commerce, finance, gaming, graphical and packaging, 
hair and beauty, information technologies, media, entertain-
ment and arts, mail and logistics, social insurance, sport, tem-
porary and agency worker, and tourism industries.184
2. UNI Signs IFA Accepting a “Positive Role” for Temp Agency 
Work 
 
The temp agency IFA recognizes Convention 181 and Rec-
ommendation 188 regarding temp agency work.185 The IFA 
states that it provides a “framework that allows for the im-
proved functioning of private employment agencies[.]”186 Many 
of the principles in Convention 181 are contained, as we will 
see, in the temp agency IFA.187 The IFA then proceeds with the 
parties’ pledge to live up to the ILO’s core labor rights. The 
temp agency IFA reads: “The signatories to this MoU [Memo-
randum of Understanding] recognize . . .[t]hat temporary agen-
cy work contributes to improve the functioning of labour mar-
kets and fulfils [sic] specific needs for both companies and 
workers and aims at complementing other forms of employ-
ment[.]”188
This language tracks Convention 181, which states that 
the ILO is “aware of the importance of flexibility in the func-
  
 
 180. Id. The firm realized over €2.8 billion in revenue for 2012, though the 
author was unable to find figures regarding the number of workers it places in 
user firms. See Press Release, USG People N.V., Transitional Year Strength-
ens Foundation for the Future (Mar. 1, 2013), http://phx.corporate 
-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9MTczOTY5fENoaWxkSUQ9LTF 
8VHlwZT0z&t=1. 
 181. About Us, UNI GLOBAL UNION, http://www.uniglobalunion.org/about 
-us (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
 182. Id.  
 183. See Regions, UNI GLOBAL UNION, http://www.uniglobalunion.org/ 
regions (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).  
 184. About Us, supra note 180. 
 185. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 3. 
 186. Id. at 2. 
 187. Compare id. with ILO Convention 181, supra note 151. 
 188. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, at 2. 
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tioning of labour markets” and recognizes “the role which pri-
vate employment agencies may play in a well-functioning la-
bour market[.]. . .”189
Management representatives that the author interviewed 
were particularly pleased with the laudatory language in the 
IFA favoring the industry.
 Hence, the temp agency IFA, like Conven-
tion 181, recognizes temp agencies as legitimate and useful 
labor market actors. As we saw above, it also follows Ciett’s 
goal to disseminate positive messages regarding temp agency 
work. 
190 Partly because of this language, 
Ciett called the IFA a “win-win” agreement.191
• Facilitating fluctuations in the labour market, e.g. the matching of 
supply and demand. 
 Citing the IFA at 
length is warranted to better comprehend why temp agencies 
were so pleased with their agreement. The relevant language 
states that temp agencies contribute to the labor market by: 
• Implementing active labour market policies and creating path-
ways between unemployment and employment by: 
o Helping jobseekers entering or re-entering the labour mar-
ket. 
o Helping disadvantaged people entering into the labour 
market. 
o Providing more work opportunities for more people. 
• Facilitating the transition between education and work, e.g. by 
providing students and young workers with their first access to 
professional life and an opportunity to gain work experience. 
• Facilitating the transition between assignments and jobs by 
providing agency workers with vocational training. 
• Promoting conversion between different types of work contracts, 
e.g. by assisting in a transition from a temporary agency contract 
to fixed-term or open-ended contracts. 
• Improving life work balance, e.g. by providing flexible working 
time arrangements such as part-time work and flexible working 
hours. 
• Helping fight undeclared work.192
As we can see, the IFA attempts to provide balanced language 
recognizing that regulated temp agency work can find a legiti-
mate place in the labor market to benefit employers and work-
ers. The IFA seems to build on ILO Convention 181 to greater 
 
 
 189. ILO Convention 181, supra note 151, at 251. 
 190. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64. 
 191. Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164. 
 192. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 1. 
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detail “the role which private employment agencies may play in 
a well-functioning labour market.”193
Under paragraph two of the temp agency IFA, the parties 
agreed on regulatory principles to protect workers.
 
194 The IFA 
calls for practices where workers’ rights are not harmed, where 
unionization is better safeguarded, and where the worst kinds 
of abuses, such as human trafficking, are avoided, among other 
pledges.195
In its paragraph three, the agreement reiterates ILO Con-
vention 181.
  
196 It also references Recommendation 188 on pri-
vate agencies, including the provision that calls for no fees to be 
levied on employees placed by the agencies.197 The IFA states 
the need to protect freedom of association, social dialogue, and 
attention to employee benefits.198 Perhaps very importantly, the 
temp agencies also pledged not to provide workers to end users 
who could be used as strike replacements.199 The temp agency 
agreement states: “UNI and Ciett Corporate Members agree 
that a regulatory framework on temporary agency work must 
include and promote . . . [p]rohibition of the replacement of 
striking workers by temporary agency workers without preju-
dice to national legislation or practices.”200
In addition, the agreement sets some actions that the par-
ties should take at the national and global levels. At the na-
tional level, the parties pledged to eliminate obstacles that 
make it difficult for temp agencies to operate.
 Ciett and its corpo-
rate members pledged not to provide strikebreakers to end us-
ers. 
201 The parties al-
so pledged to promote a balanced regulatory system for the 
agencies and for employees.202 The parties should attain such 
goals through social dialogue.203
 
 193. ILO Convention 181, supra note 
  
151, at 251. 
 194. Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 1. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. ¶ 3. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. The exact language reads: “Identify and review obstacles of a legal or 
administrative nature which may limit the opportunities for temporary agency 
work to operate, and, where appropriate, work with the national governments 
to eliminate them.” Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, ¶ 4. 
 202. See id. 
 203. The exact language reads: 
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At the global level, the parties pledged to “[w]ork with the 
ILO to promote ratification of ILO Convention 181 and the ap-
plication of Recommendation 188,” and cooperate with interna-
tional organizations to eliminate human trafficking.204 They al-
so agreed to continue to research the industry and further 
improve on “perceptions and conditions for both workers and 
employers[.]”205 Finally, the agreement provides guidelines for 
implementation, including pledges to disseminate the agree-
ment and meet twice a year to discuss it in a “review commit-
tee” composed of the signatory parties.206
3. Trust Facilitated the IFA 
  
At first blush, the temp agency IFA looks extraordinary. It 
is a multi-employer agreement and appears to be industry-
wide. The IFA sets a general framework for UNI, Ciett, and its 
corporate members to work together for an agenda to regulate 
temp agency work. The parties were able to reach agreement to 
sign the IFA as a result of their longstanding prior dealings, 
which likely have led the parties to establish trust.207
Since about 1999, European labor has been trying to estab-
lish a regulatory framework for temp agencies in Europe, par-
 
 
Review the need for systems of licensing and inspection and when 
relevant, work with the national governments for the introduction of 
such systems (which can include financial guarantees), which will 
contribute to the development of good industry standards, provided 
that such systems are proportional, non- discriminatory and objective 
and do not aim at hampering the development of temporary agency 
work. 
Id.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. ¶ 5. 
 207. Prior and current dealings and agreements pertaining to Ciett and 
UNI European collaborations seem to have been deemed successful by Ciett 
members. For example, a representative of Adecco told me that agreements 
between Ciett and UNI “are a testimony to the fact that the Social Dialogue in 
our Industry does work!” E-mail from Bettina Schaller, supra note 167. She 
mentioned as an example the Joint Eurociett/UNI Europa Recommendations 
on Temporary Agency Work Facilitating Transitions in the Labour Market of 
2012, which “is aimed at EU policy makers on how to maximise the role of 
temporary agency work in facilitating labour market transitions.” Id.; see also 
EUROCIETT & UNI EUROPA, JOINT EUROCIETT/UNI EUROPA RECOMMENDA-
TIONS ON TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK FACILITATING TRANSITIONS IN THE LA-
BOUR MARKET (2012), available at http://www.eurociett.eu/fileadmin/ 
templates/eurociett/docs/Social_dialogue/Transitions_project/ 
Recommendations/Eurociett_UNI_Europa_-_Joint_recommendations_on_ 
transitions_-_signed.pdf (recommending how to improve the experience of 
temporary workers).  
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ticularly during the European Union discussions for a directive 
on temp agency work.208 In Europe, the Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE which today is 
renamed BUSINESSEUROPE) and the European Centre of 
Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of 
General Economic Interest (CEEP) represented employers as 
“social partners” on all issues regarding labor regulation, in-
cluding temp agency work.209 However, Ciett came to the fore as 
an independent group to represent the temp agency sector dur-
ing European debates in 1999.210 UNI Europa, the Europe 
branch of UNI, became Ciett’s European department and 
Eurociett’s labor counterpart.211 Ciett was generally more will-
ing to make concessions on some issues than UNICE and CEEP 
had been, such as in the provision of strikebreakers.212
The IFA became an extension of what UNI and Ciett had 
been doing for Europe, but now for the rest of the world. In this 
way, the agreement conforms to the kind of “continuous bar-
gaining model” explained by Professor Egels-Zandén and prior 
research that has shown the importance of trust for IFAs.
  
213 In 
that particular time when the temp agency IFA was signed, in 
2008, Ciett and its corporate members sought to further the le-
gitimacy of temp agency work around the world.214 UNI was 
seeking to find a global regulatory environment for said work 
and also to organize the sector.215
 
 208. See Kerstin Ahlberg, A Story of a Failure—But Also of Success, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LABOUR REGULATION: A CASE STUDY OF TEMPORARY AGENCY 
WORK 191, 196–97, 207–08, 216, 220 (SALTSA–Joint Programme for Working 
Life Research in Eur. ed., 2008) (explaining how Ciett came to the fore in Eu-
ropean debates in 1999 to represent the temp agency sector when the Europe-
an Union attempted to jump-start discussions for a temp agency work legisla-
tion. Ciett was generally more willing to make concessions on some issues that 
users of temp agency workers did not in order to pursue its goals of gaining a 
more friendly regulatory environment for temp agency work and gaining legit-
imacy as a social partner. One of those concessions included not providing 
workers to end users that could use them to replace strikers); see also Emma 
L. Jones, Temporary Agency Labour: Back to Square One?, 31 INDUS. L.J. 183, 
183–84, 187–88 (2002) (discussing Social Partners’ difficulty agreeing about 
the role of temporary workers during negotiations). 
 
 209. Ahlberg, supra note 208, at 196, 198. 
 210. Id. at 196. 
 211. Id. at 196, 218. 
 212. Id. at 208. 
 213. Egels-Zandén, supra note 29, at 538–41.  
 214. See Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164.  
 215. See Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.  
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The Ciett representative told the author that UNI ap-
proached Ciett to sign the temp agency IFA at a time when it 
was looking for global acceptance of the industry.216 Temporary 
service firms are generally denounced as anti-worker and anti-
union by some labor unions and governments around the world. 
Hence, the IFA was intended to be used to gain more global le-
gitimacy for temp agency work.217
A representative of Kelly Services told the author a similar 
account of why the organization signed the IFA. To paraphrase 
the representative’s statement, Kelly Services in particular fa-
vored the IFA because UNI Global Union represents workers 
employed by the sector around the world.
  
218 The idea behind the 
IFA was to send a signal that temp agencies and unions could 
work together and discuss issues that concerned both parties, 
such as human trafficking and unfair labor practices, which 
could be committed by the less ethical companies involved in 
global staffing work.219
Adecco’s representative also voiced a similar reason ac-
counting for the signing of the temp agency IFA, i.e. insufficient 
legitimacy of temp agency work. An excerpt from the author’s 
notes states as follows: “Adecco is very open to hav[ing] interac-
tions with labor unions because it is looking for recognition 
since the industry players [have] a problem with ‘recognition’ 
as social partners.”
 
220
Adecco is very open to hav[ing] interactions with labor unions because 
it is looking to build the proper regulatory environment to guarantee 
worker[s’]’ rights. Despite their efforts, Staffing Industry players have 
a problem with recognition as social partners in many countries, so 
this [IFA] provided a perfect opportunity to signal that one global la-
bor union partner was willing to mutually move ahead.
 Adecco’s representative further elaborat-
ed on her statement, telling the author that: 
221
Hence, we can conclude that Adecco’s goal was to actively en-
gage with labor unions globally and obtain more legitimacy for 
temp agency work and for Ciett as a “social partner.”
 
222
Similarly, Manpower also was looking for legitimacy in in-
dustrial relations at the global level. An excerpt from the au-
 
 
 216. Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, supra note 64. 
 219. See id.  
 220. Telephone Interview with Bettina Schaller, Grp. Pub. Affairs, Adecco 
(August 14, 2012). 
 221. E-mail from Bettina Schaller, supra note 167. 
 222. Id. 
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thor’s notes reads the following way: “[T]he IFA was made pos-
sible because UNI Global [Union] started the process with the 
position that temporary service employers have something pos-
itive to contribute to society (this language was found in the 
agreement), and this was tremendously important for the [IFA] 
to come to fruition.”223
Moreover, for Manpower, the parties were binding them-
selves to work together to find more legitimate spaces for temp 
agency work.
  
224 The parties were committing themselves as so-
cial partners.225 Notes from the author’s interview with the 
Manpower representative state: “In this sense, the IFA was dif-
ferent from others because according to [Manpower], other[] 
[agreements] are ‘one-sided’ towards the union. Here, the union 
had to ‘deliver’ as both parties pledged to work together.”226
UNI shares some of Ciett’s motivations for the IFA. A UNI 
representative told the author that the main goal of UNI was to 
develop “social dialogue” with temp agencies because temp 
agency work was becoming more predominant globally.
 
Each party was expected to contribute to the relationship. 
227 But 
UNI also wanted to regulate temp agency work, not just give 
legitimacy to the sector and to Ciett.228 According to UNI, many 
large employers use agency work to undermine trade union 
rights.229 Many industries hire temporary workers to replace 
core permanent staff.230 They do it to cut costs, weaken collec-
tive bargaining, union power and density.231 Given this reality, 
UNI felt that it could not just sit on its hands. It had to engage 
with this global player and seek ways to regulate it.232
According to UNI, it was difficult to jump-start discussions 
with Ciett because many of its affiliates and other global un-
ions either opposed temp agencies altogether or did not see 
Ciett as a legitimate partner for social dialogue.
  
233
 
 223. Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 
 However, as 
the UNI representative told the author, UNI believed that “if 
64. 
 224. Id.  
 225. Id. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.  
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. 
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we wanted to protect workers[,] we had to talk to these 
firms.”234
Moreover, UNI wanted to have a social partner on the side 
of management, and Ciett became the leading prospect.
 
235 Per-
haps most importantly, UNI also wanted to organize the agen-
cy workers, starting with their in-house staff.236
Finally, UNI had a goal to cover agency workers with the 
collective agreements of the relevant user sector.
 We can there-
fore conclude that UNI’s preexisting relationship with Ciett 
was pivotal for the IFA.  
237 However, 
this goal was not achieved.238 Ciett wanted its corporate mem-
bers to have a collective agreement of their own, so there was 
no agreement on this point.239
To summarize, the temp agency IFA is an entryway into 
global social dialogue and industrial relations for Ciett. It also 
helped UNI to negotiate ways to better regulate temp agency 
work in the sector where it represents workers. UNI’s preexist-
ing relationship with Ciett helped the parties reach the global 
agreement.
 As we will see below, separate 
collective bargaining agreement for temp agencies issue also 
became a sticking point for the rest of the global union move-
ment. 
240
4. A Relationship on “Neutral”? 
 The IFA aims to create social dialogue for legisla-
tive and regulatory initiatives related to temp agencies. How-
ever, as the author will explain below, even this limited goal to 
pursue legislative and regulatory changes was at least on par-
tial hold because the global union movement was unwilling to 
give Ciett the degree of legitimacy that Ciett expected after 
signing the IFA.  
Despite the collaborative language in the temp agency IFA, 
Ciett and its corporate members communicated disappointment 
 
 234. Id. 
 235. See id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id. 
 240. UNI-Europa, the European branch of UNI, and Eurociett, the Europe-
an branch of Ciett, had worked together at least since 1999 for European Un-
ion legislation on temp agency work, sometimes amidst opposition from other 
union and employer associations. Hence, UNI and Ciett have a long relation-
ship where they attempt to work together to pursue common goals. See 
Ahlberg, supra note 208, at 196, 200–01, 218–20. 
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with the IFA because the response of the global unions’ move-
ment to the IFA was rather cool.241 Some global unions seem to 
have rejected the IFA altogether. Part of the global union back-
lash that disappointed Ciett included the so-called Global Un-
ion Principles on Temporary Work Agencies that, according to 
Ciett, lacked the “win-win” language contained in the IFA.242 
These principles were signed by all global unions including 
UNI.243
• “The primary form of employment shall be permanent, 
open-ended and direct . . . .”
 They stated that: 
244
• “Agency workers must . . . be covered by all collective bar-
gaining agreements applying to the user enterprise.”
 
245
• “[Temporary agency workers] must be accorded equal 
treatment and opportunities . . . with regular and perma-
nent employees with respect to terms and conditions of 
employment.”
 
246
• The use of temporary agencies should not increase the 
gender gap on wages, social protections, and conditions;
 
247
• “Temporary work agencies must not be used to eliminate 
permanent and direct employment relationships . . . .”
 
248
• The use of agency workers should never be used to weaken 
 
 
 241. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64 (ex-
plaining political, inter-union conflicts are barring the IFA’s implementation); 
Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, supra note 64 (expressing disap-
pointment with dismissive manner of global unions towards the IFA); Tele-
phone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164 (noting some global unions 
questioned the IFA’s ability to really represent the interests of all workers 
across all sectors); Telephone interview with Bettina Schaller, supra note 220 
(acknowledging it is always easy to find a union that does not support the 
temporary work industry). 
 242. See Telephone Interview with Denis Pennel, supra note 164 (for ex-
ample, they did not endorse support of the temporary worker industry); see 
also Ciett Reacts to Global Unions’ Principles on TAW, supra note 156 (calling 
for “further dialogue between the two organisations”). 
 243. The document containing the principles reads: 
Policy positions differ in the trade union movement, both at national 
and international levels concerning the use of temporary work agen-
cies. Views vary from total bans on such agencies, to partial bans, to 
strict regulation. There are also differences as to on what basis work-
ers should be covered by collective bargaining agreements. However, 
there are certain views shared by all Global Unions. 
Council of Global Unions, supra note 155 (emphasis added). 
 244. Id. at 3. 
 245. Id. at 1. 
 246. Id. at 3. 
 247. See id. at 4. 
 248. Id. at 3. 
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trade unions or to undermine organizing or collective bar-
gaining rights.249
The Global Union Principles on Temporary Work Agencies, as 
we can see, made explicit reference to the less desirable work 
provided by temp agencies and underscored the possibility of 
anti-union, gender and other biases and inequalities that agen-
cy work may foment.
 
250 The laudatory language of temp agency 
work was absent in the global union principles.251 Ciett was not 
pleased by the statements from the global unions.252
Moreover, one of the largest global unions, IndustriALL, 
publicly scorned Ciett, raising doubts as to whether the global 
union gave any legitimacy to Ciett as a social partner for the 
fledgling global labor industrial relations system. In its latest 
pamphlet on temp agencies it called Ciett part of a “strong in-
dustry lobby” that pushed “myths” regarding temp agency 
work.
 
253
  Ciett produces a range of publications that support these objec-
tives and give insight to the arguments the industry uses to gloss over 
the negative consequences of agency work and to promote it to em-
ployers and governments. Ciett’s characterization of the private em-
ployment industry falls far short of the reality experienced by millions 
of agency workers worldwide, and by the unions that try to improve 
their working conditions. 
 IndustriALL stated that: 
  Ciett bases its claims on narrow surveys of companies almost en-
tirely in the US and western Europe, yet generalizes the claims to en-
compass all agency work worldwide.254
Moreover, in its pamphlet against temp agency work, 
IndustriALL included a “Ciett Myth Buster” section that listed 
Ciett’s alleged lies about temp agency work.
 
255
• “Agencies create jobs without substituting permanent 
jobs”;
 According to 
IndustriALL, these myths were that:  
256
 
 249. See id. at 2–3.  
 
 250. See id. 
 251. See id. 
 252. See Ciett Reacts to Global Unions’ Principles on TAW, supra note 156 
(stating “a number of points mentioned in [the] document . . . need to be clari-
fied and/or corrected”).  
 253. INDUSTRIALL GLOBAL UNION, THE TRIANGULAR TRAP: UNIONS TAKE 
ACTION AGAINST AGENCY LABOUR 9–10 (2012), available at http://www 
.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/Triangular_Trap/ 
agency_work_final.pdf. 
 254. Id. at 9.  
 255. Id. at 9–11. 
 256. Id. at 10. 
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• “Agency work is an effective way of finding permanent 
work”;257
• “Private employment services only contribute to better 
labour markets when properly regulated”;
 
258
• “Private employment services deliver decent work”;
 
259
• “In many countries agency work is being recognized as a 
lifestyle choice.”
 
[and] 
260
Whether or not IndustriALL was correct in its appreciation of 
temp agency work, we can clearly see that IndustriALL directly 
targeted Ciett as an adversary. IndustriALL’s statements con-
tradicted the temp agency IFA in as much as IndustriALL did 
not recognize any positive elements of temp agency work and 
viewed any positive language about such work as “myths.”
 
261
As of November of 2012, when the research here was con-
cluded, UNI did not express the same feelings of disappoint-
ment regarding the temp agency IFA that Ciett had expressed, 
but it acknowledged that the relationship with Ciett and its 
corporate members had deteriorated.
 
This was a significant contradiction with the letter and the 
spirit of the temp agency IFA. 
262 According to the UNI 
representative, the relationship had become neither cooperative 
nor adversarial but “neutral.”263 Part of this souring of the rela-
tionship was that Ciett and its corporate members believed 
that UNI had agreed to support a balanced regulatory envi-
ronment for temp agency work and not to oppose it.264 UNI does 
not believe that signing the Union Global Principles on Tempo-
rary Work Agencies violates the IFA.265
 
 257. Id. 
 This different view of 
the IFA, at least until November of 2012, generated a stale-
mate that made it difficult for the parties to implement the IFA 
broadly. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 11. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. at 9–11. 
 262. See Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64. 
 263. Id.  
 264. See Temp Agency IFA, supra note 150, at 3–4.  
 265. See Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.  
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IV.  DISCUSSION: THE NEED FOR NON-BINDING 
ARBITRATION BASED ON ILO NORMS   
The previous discussion has shown that IFAs are a product 
of trust between parties who have had enduring bargaining re-
lationships. The Volkswagen IFA and Daimler IFA were signed 
by German firms and employee representation bodies that have 
been negotiating issues for many years.266 Perhaps to the cha-
grin of American stakeholders in these agreements, German 
employee representatives and unions have sided with man-
agement over the meaning of freedom of association and what 
“neutrality” would mean in a U.S. organizing situation.267 The 
Germans have argued that freedom of association principles do 
not include card check recognition in the United States, which 
is the preferred method of union recognition for most U.S. un-
ions.268
On the other hand, the temp agency IFA seems more 
“global.” UNI brokered the IFA and helped obtain pledges from 
the temp agencies to abide with ILO norms, including those 
pertinent to regulating temp agencies and to ban the provision 
of strikebreakers to end users. The agreement was made possi-
ble by UNI’s prior engagements with Ciett in European Union 
discussions for a directive on temp agencies, among others.
 Differences between unions such as these may endanger 
IFAs. 
269 
However, Ciett was not given the legitimacy it sought as a re-
sult of the IFA.270 The global unions, including UNI, proclaimed 
“principles” of temp agency work that contradict the balanced 
approach set in the IFA and Convention 181 of the ILO.271 At 
least as of November of 2012, UNI expressed the view that the 
relationship was not very cordial—“neutral”272—while Ciett and 
the corporate members were unsure about the progress, if any, 
that had been made with the IFA.273
One way to resolve these disputes over IFA interpretation 
is to make the IFAs judicially enforceable and authorize courts 
  
 
 266. Stevis, supra note 69, at 122–25.  
 267. Interview with Claudia Rahman, supra note 69. 
 268. Id. 
 269. See Ahlberg, supra note 208, at 196, 200–01, 218–20. 
 270. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.  
 271. See supra notes242–52 and accompanying text. 
 272. Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, supra note 64.  
 273. See Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, supra note 64; Telephone 
Interview with Pam Berklich, supra note 64; Telephone Interview with Denis 
Pennel, supra note 164; Telephone Interview with Bettina Schaller, supra note 
220. 
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to interpret the terms. However, parties may not want to bind 
themselves legally. If trust between the parties has been pivot-
al to create these agreements, parties may be unwilling to for-
mally include strangers such as courts in their relationships. 
The parties could, however, be willing to request expert adviso-
ry opinions, or non-binding, voluntary arbitration, to resolve in-
terpretation impasses. Therefore, non-binding arbitration 
based on ILO norms can help to resolve issues of interpretation. 
In fact, at least one IFA, Inditex’s IFA with IndustriALL, has 
such an arbitration clause.274 In that IFA, the parties subjected 
interpretation issues to advisory opinions of the ILO if the par-
ties could not find agreement.275 As the Inditex IFA states: 
“Questions concerning the interpretation of the Agreement 
shall be resolved through consultation between Inditex and 
[IndustriALL]. Every effort will be made to find common 
agreement but where this is not possible Inditex and 
[IndustriALL] will, in appropriate circumstances, seek the ex-
pert advice of the ILO.”276
A. CARD CHECKS? “NO.” EMPLOYER NON-INTERFERENCE AND 
MINORITY UNIONS? “YES.” 
 Similar advisory opinions, from the 
ILO or other neutrals who can base their judgments on ILO 
norms, could help the parties find agreement when they ex-
haust possibilities within bilateral talks. The Article explains 
below how the conflicts in the German auto and temp agency 
IFAs may be resolved by a neutral arbitrator inspired by ILO 
norms. 
The ILO has never taken a position on whether card checks 
are necessary to protect freedom of association in the United 
States, but if it had to do so, it almost certainly would deter-
mine that card checks are not necessary to guarantee freedom 
of association if U.S. employers refrain from opposing the union 
during an organizing attempt. Therefore, non-interference and 
 
 274. International Framework Agreement on the Implementation of Inter-
national Labour Standards Throughout the Inditex Supply Chain, Industria 
de Diseño Textil, S.A. (Inditex, S.A.)-The International Textile, Garment and 
Leather Workers’ Federation (ITGLWF), Oct. 4, 2007, available at http://www 
.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/GFAs/Inditex/ 
inditex-gfa-english.pdf [hereinafter Inditex Agreement]. ITGLWF is 
IndustriALL’s predecessor organization. Inditex, INDUSTRIALL (May 5, 2012), 
http://www.industriall-union.org/inditex/. 
 275. Inditex Agreement, supra note 274, at 4. 
 276. Id.  
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union elections, the German automakers’ view of their pledge 
in the IFAs,277
First, the ILO adheres to the principle of “non-
interference,” which has meant that individuals, organizations 
and public authorities should not interfere with the rights of 
association of others.
 meet ILO freedom of association principles. 
278 This should mean, as German au-
tomakers, their works councils and the German labor unions 
have stated, that employers are obligated under the IFAs not to 
proactively oppose the union.279
The ILO has dealt with the question of union recognition 
and how to better determine which labor organizations are 
“most representative.” On numerous occasions the ILO has 
pronounced the standard to determine union representative-
ness; it requires “pre-established, precise and objective crite-
ria. . . .”
 Agreeing to recognize the union 
through a card check would oblige the parties to more than in-
ternational norms mandate.  
280
The Committee wishes to recall, firstly, that Conventions Nos. 87 and 
98 are compatible both with systems which foresee union representa-
tion, for the exercise of collective trade union rights, based upon the 
 Such criteria, moreover, can include systems in 
which representativeness is evaluated based on the union’s 
membership or whether workers vote for their representatives, 
or a combination of both. As the Committee on Freedom of As-
sociation recently expressed in a case involving the Basque re-
gion of Spain: 
 
 277. See Daimler IFA, supra note 94; Volkswagen IFA, supra note 105. 
 278. As Article 2(1) of Convention 98 of the ILO states, “[w]orkers’ and em-
ployers’ organisations shall enjoy adequate protection against any acts of in-
terference by each other or each others’ agents or members in their establish-
ment, functioning or administration.” Right to Organise and Collective 
Bargaining Convention, July 1, 1949, Int’l Labor Org. (emphasis added), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/ 
---dialogue/documents/publication/wcms_168332.pdf; see also International 
Labour Conference, June 8−July 2, 1949, Record of Proceedings, 306, 469, 
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09616/09616(1949-32).pdf 
(discussing arguments over principle of reciprocal protection);  LANCE COMPA, 
INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, FREE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCI-
ATION: FINDING THE BALANCE, 3 (2013), available at http://www.ituc 
-csi.org/IMG/pdf/free_speech_and_freedom_of_association_final-2.pdf.  
 279. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 280. International Labor Organization [ILO], Rep. of Comm. on Freedom of 
Ass’n, (302nd Rep.) Vol. LXXIX, 1996, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 1817 (India) 
¶ 325; ILO, Comm. On Freedom of Ass’n, (330th Rep.) Vol. LXXXVI, 2003, Se-
ries B, No. 1, Case No. 2132 (Madagascar) ¶ 588; ILO, Comm. On Freedom of 
Ass’n, (333rd Rep.) Vol. LXXXVII, 2004, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2288 (Niger) 
¶ 827; ILO, Comm. On Freedom of Ass’n, (336th Rep.) Vol. LXXXVIII, 2005, 
Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2334 (Portugal) ¶ 1220. 
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degree of actual union membership, as well as with those foreseeing 
such union representation on the basis of general ballots of workers 
or officials, or, yet again, with systems constituting a combination of 
both.281
Therefore, the Committee on Freedom of Association would find 
that the American “card check,” where actual union member-
ship is used to establish a union’s representativeness, is a legit-
imate instrument to determine the representativeness of an or-
ganization. But such a method would not be the only one 
sanctioned by the ILO. Elections also would be legitimate in-
struments to determine a union’s representativeness, as long as 
workers are exercising their right to choose freely and without 
employer interference. Given ILO jurisprudence, and assuming 
that employees can choose their union representatives without 
interference through union elections, it would be hard to envi-
sion a Committee on Freedom of Association decision stating 
that the card check procedure is the only guarantor of freedom 
of association in the United States. The Daimler and 
Volkswagen IFAs, therefore, abide by ILO norms to the extent 
the firms remain “neutral” during a union election, i.e., do not 
interfere with workers’ rights to choose their representatives. 
 
Moreover, even though the Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation has jurisprudence that would not invalidate the “card 
check,” it has stated that the ideal form of verifying representa-
tiveness of an organization is through something akin to a se-
cret ballot election supervised by a neutral party. The Commit-
tee on Freedom of Association recently declared the following in 
a case concerning the ways that India verified a labor organiza-
tion’s representativeness: 
The Committee is of the view that pre-established, precise and objec-
tive criteria for the determination of the representativity of workers’ 
and employers’ organizations should exist in the legislation and such 
a determination should not be left to the discretion of govern-
ments. The Committee believes that such a determination of ascer-
taining or verifying the representative character of trade unions can 
best be made when strong guarantees of secrecy and impartiality are 
offered. Thus, verification of the representative character of a union 
should a priori be carried out by an independent and impartial 
body.282
 
 281. ILO, Comm. on Freedom of Ass’n, (320th Rep.) Vol. LXXXIII, 2000, 
Series B, No. 1, Case No. 2040 (Spain) ¶ 669. 
 
 282. ILO, Rep. of the Committee on Freedom of Association (302nd Rep.) 
Vol. LXXIX, 1996, Series B, No. 1, Case No. 1817 (India) ¶ 325 (citation omit-
ted). 
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While the Committee on Freedom of Association has not pro-
vided that only government-administered union elections, or 
NLRB-type elections, are the most desirable, it has stated that 
an “independent and impartial” body should carry out a verifi-
cation process where “secrecy and impartiality” are guaran-
teed.283
We want to emphasize that American labor law fails to 
meet ILO freedom of association principles. First, it provides 
employers with the right to interfere with the employee’s choice 
to join a union.
 That process, under the American system, seems best 
provided by the secret ballot election, to the extent workers 
have free choice. Hence, the card check system, while likely to 
be legitimate under international standards, may not be the 
most optimal under ILO norms. 
284 This issue is being discussed in Canada, a 
country that closely follows the American NLRA in many re-
gards and where the Supreme Court of Canada has had to de-
termine if and how Canadian labor law meets freedom of asso-
ciation principles.285 One scholar has noted that Canada 
infringes upon international freedom of association rights by 
excluding union organizers from the workplace during a union-
ization campaign.286 The almost total exclusion of union organ-
izers from employer property in the United States, which has 
been permitted since the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB287
 
 283. Id.  
 in 1992, would similarly violate free-
dom of association principles. But U.S. violations of interna-
tional labor standards do not stop with the exclusion of union 
organizers from the workplace. Employer opposition during 
election campaigns, administrative and legal inertia to redress 
violations, exclusion of entire categories of workers from cover-
age such as agricultural workers, inadequate enforcement re-
sources, insufficient remedies for bad faith bargaining, the 
 284. See LANCE COMPA, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF AS-
SOCIATION IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
STANDARDS 9–10 (2004). 
 285. David J. Doorey, Union Access to Workers During Organizing Cam-
paigns: A New Look Through the Lens of B.C. Health Services, 15 CAN. LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 1, 12–17, 22–29 (2009) (explaining how Canadian law violates free-
dom of association principles because it lets employers exclude union organiz-
ers from workplaces); see also Health Servs. and Support-Facilities Subsector 
Bargaining Ass’n v. B.C., [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 ¶¶ 70, 79 (Can.) (stating that 
Canadian labor law should provide the same level of protection as ILO Con-
vention 87, which Canada has ratified). 
 286. Doorey, supra note 285, at 12–17. 
 287. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
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permissibility of permanent strike replacements, among other 
things, make the American NLRA fall short of meeting interna-
tional norms.288 In fact, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of As-
sociation has found the United States to be in likely violation of 
freedom of association principles because it fails to provide ef-
fective collective bargaining rights in the public sector and be-
cause it denies freedom of association rights to graduate stu-
dents who work for universities.289 U.S. labor law is not a 
bastion for workers’ free association.290
Employers who have signed on to IFAs should also recog-
nize “minority unions,” which are labor unions that lack major-
ity support.
 
291 Such labor organizations would represent only 
their members.292 Employers who do not recognize bargaining 
rights of employees simply because the union lacks majority 
support eviscerate freedom of association rights. The ILO has 
been clear that minority unions should have the right to bar-
gain with employers when there is no majority union or formal 
union in place.293
 
 288. See COMPA,  supra note 
 As the Freedom of Association Committee of 
the ILO has stated: 
284, at 9; see also David S. Weissbrodt & Mat-
thew Mason, Compliance of the United States with International Labor Law, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 1842 (2014). 
 289. ILO, Rep. of Committee on Freedom of Association (362nd Rep.), 2011, 
Case No. 2741 (United States), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/ 
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:50002:0::NO::P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID: 
2912150; Id. at (350th Rep.), 2008, Case No. 2547 (United States), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_ 
COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2910631; Id. at (344th Rep.), 2007, Case No. 2460 
(United States), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000: 
50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2909835; Id. at (343rd 
Rep.), 2006, Case No. 2292 (United States), available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ 
ID:2908140. 
 290. See JAMES A. GROSS, A SHAMEFUL BUSINESS: THE CASE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE  96–103 (2010). 
 291. See CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 88 (2005). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Recommendation 91 of the ILO states the following: 
For the purpose of this Recommendation, the term collective agree-
ments means all agreements in writing regarding working conditions 
and terms of employment concluded between an employer, a group of 
employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, 
and one or more representative workers' organisations, or, in the ab-
sence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly 
elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and 
regulations, on the other. 
ILO Recommendation (No. 91), Collective Agreements Recommendation (June 
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Problems may arise when the law stipulates that a trade union must 
receive the support of 50 per cent of the members of a bargaining unit 
to be recognized as a bargaining agent: a majority union which fails to 
secure this absolute majority is thus denied the possibility of bargain-
ing. The Committee considers that under such a system, if no union 
covers more than 50 per cent of the workers, collective bargaining 
rights should be granted to all the unions in this unit, at least on be-
half of their own members.294
ILO norms cannot be clearer about the right of minority unions 
where there is no majority bargaining agent available. There-
fore, while IFA signatories need not recognize unions through 
card checks, they still should recognize a minority of workers 
who want to bargain collectively with the employer.  
 
Professor David Doorey has made precisely this kind of 
suggestion to help Canada conform to international labor 
norms and its own Charter, which guarantees the right to col-
lective bargaining.295 Canadian labor law, as American labor 
law, leaves millions of Canadian workers bereft of collective 
bargaining right because it sanctions the right only when there 
is a legally-sanctioned, majority union.296 Professor Doorey has 
argued that Canadian employers should recognize minority un-
ions when “thicker” rights are unavailable under the strictures 
of Canadian labor law.297 Recognition of minority unions for 
members only would bring Canada closer to meeting ILO 
norms.298
In conclusion, an arbitrator following the spirit of ILO 
norms would likely find that the German industrial relations 
parties are correct in their interpretation of the IFAs’ freedom 
 
 
29, 1951) (emphasis added); see also ILO Freedom of Association 2006 Digest, 
¶ 944 and cases cited therein. 
 294. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: International La-
bour Conference 81st Sess., 1994, International Labour Office, Geneva, Switz., 
Rep. III (Part 4B) ¶ 241. 
 295. David J. Doorey, Graduated Freedom of Association: Worker Voice Be-
yond the Wagner Model, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 511, 513–14, 521 (2013). 
 296. Id. at 536–37. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. (citing Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: Interna-
tional Labour Conference 81st Sess., 1994, International Labour Office, Gene-
va, Switz., Rep. III (Part 4B) ¶ 241 and Mark Harcourt & Helen Lam, Non-
Majority Union Representation Conforms to ILO Freedom of Association Prin-
ciples and (Potentially) Promotes Inter-Union Collaboration: New Zealand Les-
sons for Canada, 34 DALHOUSIE L.J. 115, 119–20 (2011)); see also ROY J. 
ADAMS, LABOUR LEFT OUT: CANADA’S FAILURE TO PROTECT AND PROMOTE 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A HUMAN RIGHT 28–40 (2006) (explaining how 
Canadian labor law should recognize minority unions in the absence of majori-
ty unions to comply with international labor standards). 
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of association clause. The most adequate process for union 
recognition is one where the employer does not interfere with 
the workers’ right to choose union representatives and where 
workers choose through secret ballot elections administered by 
a neutral party. However, an arbitrator should add that work-
ers have the right to bargain collectively with the signatory 
employers, in representation only of themselves, when a major-
ity of the employees do not support the union. Non-binding ar-
bitration inspired by ILO norms would thus give and take from 
both sides, labor and management, in this issue regarding un-
ion recognition in the United States. Perhaps neither side will 
be completely happy with such a compromise, but such a com-
promise is better than a stalemate. In any case, concrete 
knowledge of how international labor standards would be used 
to interpret the IFA may create further incentives that compel 
the parties to agree over union recognition rules under the IFA. 
B. THE TEMP AGENCY IFA AND THE GLOBAL UNION PRINCIPLES 
ON TEMPORARY WORK AGENCIES ARE INCOMPATIBLE 
Ciett is concerned by UNI’s alleged failure to support temp 
agency work. Ciett alleges UNI’s consent to the Global Union’s 
Principles on Temporary Work Agencies violates UNI’s IFA ob-
ligations. Ciett is likely correct. 
The IFA has laudatory language regarding temp agency 
work. Convention 181 of the ILO regarding temp agency work 
contains similar, positive language regarding temp agency 
work.299
However, Ciett and UNI are not the only social partners 
relevant for discussions regarding temp agency work. Conven-
tion 181 calls on member states to consult with the “most rep-
resentative”
 The Convention does not ban temp agency work but, as 
Ciett has argued, and as the IFA advocates, it provides temp 
agency work should be regulated to make it work for all the 
parties involved. Therefore, the Global Union Principles on 
Temporary Work Agencies are at odds with the spirit of Con-
vention 181 of the ILO and the temp agency IFA. UNI should 
distance itself from one-sided language that mostly condemns 
temp agency work. 
300
 
 299. See ILO, Convention 181, supra note 
 employer and employee organizations to deter-
151, at pmbl. 
 300. The term “most representative” organization is likely to have come to 
being in international labor law when the ILO was founded and its Constitu-
tion was drafted. The ILO Constitution states: 
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mine what a temp agency covered by the convention is;301 ex-
clude certain workers from coverage or ban agency work alto-
gether in certain branches of economic activity;302 determine the 
legal status of temp agencies;303
 
The Members undertake to nominate non-Government delegates and 
advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations, if 
such organisations exist, which are most representative of employers 
or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective countries. 
 establish exceptions to the gen-
ILO CONSTITUTION, art. 3(5). 
Normally, the most representative organizations are the employer and 
employee organizations that represent the most number of employers or em-
ployees, in a relative or absolute sense, in a given country. The ILO did not 
develop a more specific definition of the term because at the time international 
organizations attempted to be more inclusive and tried not to exclude particu-
lar groups. Faina Milman-Sivan, The Virtuous Cycle: A New Paradigm for 
Democratizing Global Governance Through Deliberation, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL'Y J. 801, 816 (2009). Professor Milman-Sivan further explains as follows:  
Due to the complexity of the Credential Committee’s task, the Council 
of the League of Nations requested an advisory opinion from the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, in order to clarify the content 
of Article 3(5). This opinion, issued in 1922, established the founda-
tion for interpreting this constitutional provision and the basis for 
subsequent precedents. “Organizations” in this context was construed 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice to permit the inclu-
sion of multiple organizations. The Court rejected the contention of 
the Netherlands Confederation of Trade Unions that it was the most 
representative trade union organization in the country, and did not 
give its consent to the nomination of the non-governmental delegates. 
The Government of the Netherlands preferred to consult three other 
trade organizations that together constituted the most representative 
organizations. 
Id. at 816 n.62 (citations omitted). 
Different countries also have different ways to determine “most repre-
sentative status.” In Spain, for example, “most representative status” unions 
are those that represent at least ten percent of the national workforce or fif-
teen percent of a sub-national division, known in Spain as “communities.” See 
Spain: Most Representative Union, EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa 
.eu/emire/SPAIN/MOSTREPRESENTATIVEUNION-ES.htm (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014). A similar rule applies to establish the most representative employer 
organization. See Spain: Most Representative Employers’ Association, 
EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emire/SPAIN/MOSTREPRESE 
NTATIVEEMPLOYERSASSOCIATION-ES.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) 
(explaining about the most representative employer in Spain). In Italy, the 
most representative labor organizations are the ones that meet certain crite-
ria, including some related to membership, presence in a broad range of occu-
pational categories, presence throughout national territory, active participa-
tion in handling labour disputes and ability to bargain for its members. See 
Italy: Most Representative Union, EUROFOUND, http://www.eurofound.europa 
.eu/emire/ITALY/MOSTREPRESENTATIVEUNION-IT.htm (last visited Mar. 
25, 2014).  
 301. ILO Convention 181, supra note 151, at art. 1(c).  
 302. Id. at art. 2(4)(a), (b). 
 303. Id. at art. 3(1). 
  
2014] SOFT MEANS AND HARD CHALLENGES 1801 
 
eral ban on fees paid by workers to temp agencies under the 
Convention;304 and provide protections to migrant workers un-
der the Convention.305 The most representative employee organ-
izations also need to be involved in the investigation of com-
plaints regarding abuses and violations of workers’ rights by 
temp agencies306 and to provide better cooperation between pub-
lic and private employment agencies.307
Given the plurality of social partners involved in the regu-
lation of temp agency work, we should expect divergent voices 
including IndustriALL’s. UNI and Ciett should try to persuade 
other social partners of perspective temp agency work and stir 
other social partners closer to their position. 
 Assuming that most 
workers in any given economy are employed directly by user 
firms, the only or most relevant representatives for temp agen-
cy work are not Ciett and UNI, unless UNI represents the per-
manent employees of the relevant sector. The user firms and 
their management and labor organizations can and should form 
part of such consultations. 
Therefore, an arbitrator inspired by ILO norms would like-
ly conclude that UNI should distance itself from one-sided 
statements critical of temp agency work. While a non-binding 
opinion from a neutral third party cannot be used to compel 
UNI Global from rescinding its support of the Global Unions’ 
Principles on Temporary Work Agencies, it can become a pow-
erful tool to “shame” and cajole the global union to comply with 
its commitments. This said, neither Ciett nor UNI are exclusive 
social partners for the regulation of temp agency work. Differ-
ent views on the role of agency work on the labor market may 
be voiced by other global industrial relations players. The par-
ties will need to work together to bring other social partners 
closer to their own viewpoint on this issue. 
  CONCLUSION: FURTHER RESEARCH AND THE 
PROMISE OF IFAS   
Labor unions are losing members and influence across the 
world’s developed, capitalist democracies. The post-World War 
II social contract seems to have ended. However, the decline of 
unions in the developed, capitalist democracies is occurring at a 
 
 304. Id. at art. 7(2). 
 305. Id. at art. 8(1). 
 306. Id. at art. 10. 
 307. Id. at art. 13. 
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time when global labor seems to be growing. IFAs, a product of 
global labor, now cover about nine million workers worldwide, 
excluding contractors. IFAs have been the product of longstand-
ing bargaining relationships between multi-national companies 
and particular labor actors. In the case of German auto, the 
Global Works Councils’ relationships with the companies made 
the IFAs possible. In the case of the temp agency IFA, UNI 
Global’s longstanding relationship with Ciett enabled the IFA.  
But this exploratory study has shown that fundamental 
differences may surface between the signatory parties and oth-
er stakeholders. In auto, we saw how freedom of association 
principles fail to include the American unions’ preferred meth-
od of union recognition, the card check. German industrial rela-
tions representatives and American unions differ on this issue. 
In the temp agency IFA, we saw how UNI Global signed the 
Global Unions Principles of Temporary Work, which contra-
dicted the balanced approach to temp agency work it agreed to 
support in the IFA, likely in violation of its commitments. Such 
fundamental differences could significantly halt the effective 
use of IFAs. 
The parties and their stakeholders could solve their disa-
greements through non-binding arbitration based on ILO 
norms. The IFAs incorporate the ILO’s standards; the parties 
have agreed to them. Moreover, international labor standards 
seem neutral enough to provide a balanced resolution to practi-
cal interpretation issues under the IFAs. Further research of 
how parties are resolving interpretation issues of their IFAs, 
including those parties who have included arbitration clauses, 
non-binding or otherwise, will help us to better ascertain the 
effectiveness of arbitration in IFAs.  
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  APPENDIX: LIST OF INDIVIDUALS THE AUTHOR 
INTERVIEWED FOR THIS ARTICLE   
Interviewed in Person 
 
Interview with Wolfgang Fueter, Volkswagen Group Hu-
man Resources International, in Wolfsburg, Germany (Sept. 21, 
2012).  
Interview with Helmut Lense, Director of Automotive and 
Rubber, IndustriALL Global Union, Geneva, Switzerland (July 
11, 2012). 
Interview with Thomas Metz, Staff of the General Works 
Council, Daimler AG, in Stuttgart, Germany (Sept. 4, 2012).308
Interview with Frank Patta, Works Council Member of the 
Volkswagen Group, in Wolfsburg, Germany (Sept. 21, 2012). 
 
Interview with Claudia Rahman, International Depart-
ment, IG Metall, in Frankfurt, Germany (Sept. 3, 2012). 
Interview with Robert Steiert, retired I.M.F. (today 
IndustriALL) and IG Metall union officer, in Zurich, Switzer-
land (July 10, 2012). 
 
Interviewed by Telephone 
 
Telephone Interview with Pam Berklich, Senior Vice Pres-
ident, Kelly Services (Oct. 8, 2012). 
Telephone Interview with Göran Hultin, Legal Representa-
tive, Manpower, Inc. (July 19, 2012). 
Telephone Interview with Giedre Lelyte, Policy Officer, 
Temporary Services Agency Branch, UNI Global Union (July 
13, 2012). 
Telephone Interview with Denis Patel, Managing Director, 
CIETT (July 20, 2012). 
Telephone Interview with Bettina Schaller, Public Affairs 
Specialist, Adecco (Aug. 14, 2012). 
 
Individuals Who Only Answered E-mail Questions for 
this Article 
 
Kristin Dziczek, Center for Automotive Research (May 8, 
2013). 
 
 308. This interview is used to corroborate general facts and is not cited in 
this article. 
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Organizations that Refused to Participate in this Study 
or that Failed to Respond to the Author’s Queries 
 
 Daimler management (information obtained through sec-
ondary sources). 
 
United Auto Workers (information obtained through sec-
ondary sources). 
 
 
